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1. Introduction
After the mid-1990s, labor and total factor productivity (TFP) accelerated
in the United States but not in most other major economies. A growing
body of research has explored the robustness of the U.S. acceleration, gen-
erally concluding that the acceleration reflects an underlying technology
acceleration. This research, along with considerable anecdotal and micro-
economic evidence, suggests a substantial role for information and com-
munications technology (ICT).
1
In this paper, we seek fresh insights into the nature of the U.S. expe-
rience in an international comparative perspective. First, we focus
narrowly but more deeply on the relative productivity performance
of the United States and the United Kingdom. Second, to understand
*This work was undertaken while the author was at the Bank of England.
1. See Jorgenson (2001) or Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002) for reviews of the empirical lit-
erature on the productivity acceleration and the role of information technology. We dis-
cuss this literature in greater detail later.10 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
comparative productivity performance better, we do detailed growth
accounting at an industry level for both countries. Third, we focus on
the role of ICT, which many see as being at the heart of the productiv-
ity acceleration.
Why do we take this approach? First, the U.K. experience provides an
intriguing counterpoint to both the U.S. and continental European expe-
riences. In particular, overall macroeconomic performance looks similar
to that of the United States, but productivity performance looks similar to
that of the rest of Europe.
In terms of late 1990s macro performance, output growth in both the
United States and the United Kingdom rose, investment surged, infla-
tion moderated, and unemployment rates fell to levels that seemed
implausible just a few years earlier. In the U.S. case, many commenta-
tors attributed this strong macroeconomic performance to the strong
productivity growth. But in the U.K. case, both labor and total factor
productivity growth decelerated rather than accelerated. Hence, under-
standing the U.K. experience may provide insights into the U.S. expe-
rience.
In terms of cross-country productivity evidence, van Ark et al. (2002)
and Gust and Marquez (2002), among others, document that TFP and
labor productivity growth decelerated in the European Union overall and
in Japan.
2 To the extent that one expects ideas—especially when
embedded in easily traded physical capital—to diffuse easily across bor-
ders, the lack of a strong response abroad surprised many observers.
Hence, understanding the lack of a productivity acceleration in the
United Kingdom may provide insight into the anemic productivity
performance elsewhere.
Second, we build up from industry data in order to understand the aggre-
gate picture. Because of data limitations, most cross-country comparisons
have used aggregate data. But many hypotheses about relative productivity
growth—e.g., about the role of ICT—are observationally equivalent in
aggregate data. To implement this bottom-up approach, we construct a new
industry-level dataset for the United Kingdom that includes industry use of
information technology. This approach allows us to isolate the sources of
U.S. and U.K. productivity growth at an industry level.
Third, we seek to understand better the myriad roles of ICT in both
countries. Much discussion has focused on the distinction between the
use and production of ICT. In standard neoclassical growth accounting,
2. Gust and Marquez look at 13 industrialized countries. Compared with the 1980-1995
period, their data show a positive TFP acceleration in 1995-2000 for the United States,
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the use of ICT leads to capital deepening, which boosts labor productiv-
ity. TFP growth in producing ICT goods shows up directly in the econ-
omy's measured TFP.
This standard growth accounting framework leads to the first question
we ask of the data, for both the United States and the United Kingdom:
were the 1990s a time of rising total factor productivity growth outside the
production of ICT? Although existing work often seems to consider this
an open question, our industry data strongly support the view that most
of the TFP acceleration reflects an acceleration outside the production of
ICT goods and software.
3 Even when we focus on arguably well-measured
sectors (Griliches, 1994; Nordhaus, 2002), we find a substantial TFP accel-
eration outside ICT production.
The productivity acceleration in sectors that use ICT raises a deeper
question: does ICT itself explain some or all of the measured accelera-
tion in TFP in sectors using it? This question is at the heart of the debate
over whether computers are a new general-purpose technology.
Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998), for example, argue yes; Gordon
(2003), rejects this notion. The main feature of a general-purpose tech-
nology (GPT) is that it leads to fundamental changes in the production
process of those using the new invention. Chandler (1977) discusses sev-
eral examples, such as how railroads allowed nationwide catalog sales,
which in turn transformed retailing. David and Wright (1999) also dis-
cuss historical examples.
Indeed, the availability of cheap ICT capital is likely to effect truly
major changes only if firms can, as a result, deploy their other inputs in
radically different and productivity-enhancing ways. That is, if cheap
computers and telecommunications equipment stimulates an ever-growing
series of complementary inventions in industries using ICT, thereby con-
tinually shifting out the demand curve for ICT capital, then innovations
in the production of ICT can have substantial long-run effects before
diminishing returns set in.
Why do we focus so intently on relatively subtle arguments about the
role of ICT? An important reason is that other explanations for the U.K.
experience fall short. In particular, in this case of the missing productivity
growth, we round up and interrogate the plausible suspects. Some are
routine and can be dismissed quickly; others require deeper investigation,
as the paper discusses. The suspects include the following:
3. In our view, more studies than not find a widespread acceleration in technology. See, for
example, Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001); Baily and Lawrence (2001); Bosworth and
Triplett (2002); Council of Economic Advisers (2003); Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002);
Nordhaus (2002); Oliner and Sichel (2000); and Stiroh (2002a, 2002b). Gordon (2003)
remains a skeptic.12 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
1. Cyclical mismeasurement of inputs. Productivity is generally procycli-
cal, rising sharply in the early phase of a business cycle upswing. Basu,
Fernald, and Shapiro (2001) and the Council of Economic Advisers
(2003), using different methods, conclude that the level of unobserved
labor effort and capital utilization probably fell in the United States
after the mid-1990s. For example, both capacity utilization and hours
per worker fell over the second half of the 1990s. In the U.K. case,
macro performance was stronger in the second half of the 1990s than in
the first, making it unlikely that business-cycle considerations held
down measured productivity.
2. Differences in national accounts methodology. The United States
employs hedonic methods for some crucial ICT price indices (e.g., for
computers), while the United Kingdom and many other countries do
not. Also, the United Kingdom has only recently included software as
a form of investment in gross domestic product (GDP). Is it possible
that part of the difference between U.S. and U.K. performance is a sta-
tistical illusion? The dataset we use for the United Kingdom addresses
this issue by using U.S. methodologies.
4
3. Differences in regulation of product and labor markets. Many people sug-
gest that inflexible labor and product markets prevent European coun-
tries from benefiting from new technologies and innovations. Gust and
Marquez (2002), for example, find that countries with a more burden-
some regulatory environment—particularly regulations affecting labor
market practices—tended to adopt information technologies more slowly
and also had slower total factor productivity growth. Gust and Marquez
suggest that economies with more flexible labor and product markets
should benefit first, and to a larger extent, than less flexible economies.
But many of the institutional features—such as the extent of the labor
and product market rigidities emphasized by Gust and Marquez—are
similar in the United Kingdom and the United States. Thus, this sus-
pect seems completely absent from the scene.
4. U.K. unemployment fell sharply. When unemployment falls, low-
skilled workers are often the ones drawn disproportionately into the
labor force, reducing measured labor and total factor productivity. We
control for labor quality, but the productivity puzzle remains.
5. Differences in the size of the high-TFP-growth ICT-producing sectors.
A larger ICT sector in the United States could explain at least some of
the aggregate gap in productivity growth. But relative to GDP, the ICT-
producing sectors are about the same size in the two countries (Oulton,
2001b). And even when outside ICT production, the U.S. data still
4. A detailed description of the sources and methods used to construct the U.K. dataset is
available at www.nber.org/data (see the Bank of England Industry Dataset).The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 13
show a sharp productivity acceleration, whereas the U.K. data show an
even sharper deceleration.
6. Intensity of competition. Although measures of regulation look similar
across sectors, some commentators think that many sectors of the U.K.
economy have less competitive pressure, and that this feature retards
pressure for innovation. See Nickell, 1996, Lovegrove et al., 1998.
5
7. Disruption costs associated with investment. Investment accelerated in
both the U.S. and the U.K. data in the second half of the 1990s. Much of
the literature suggests that because of various adjustment costs, mea-
sured output and productivity are lower in the period in which the
investment takes place. Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001) argue that in
the second half of the 1990s, considerations of adjustment costs raise
the magnitude of the U.S. acceleration in "true" technology relative to
measured productivity; a similar calibration reduces the magnitude of
the slowdown in U.K. productivity growth. But such calibrations don't
resolve the puzzle, in part because they increase the acceleration in U.S.
productivity at the same time.
8. The GPT nature of ICT capital. Benefiting from ICT requires substan-
tial complementary investments in learning, reorganization, and the
like, so that the payoff in terms of measured output may be long
delayed. This is our main hypothesis. As it turns out, the evidence is
much stronger for the United States than for the United Kingdom,
where the evidence remains mixed. Much of the evidence for this
hypothesis is circumstantial—the suspect's fingerprints are all over the
crime scene.
What is the evidence for the GPT hypothesis? To begin, once we have con-
firmed that measured U.S. TFP accelerated strongly in non-ICT-producing
industries during the late 1990s, we assess whether the acceleration in
measured TFP is related to the use of ICT. We find that the U.S. results are
quite supportive of the joint hypothesis that ICT is a GPT—i.e., that
complementary investment is important for realizing the productivity
benefits of ICT investment—and that, because these complementary
investments are unmeasured, they can help explain the cross-industry
and aggregate TFP growth experience of the United States in the 1990s.
Specifically, we find that industries that had high ICT capital growth rates
in the 1980s or early 1990s (weighted by ICT revenue shares, as suggested
by theory) also had high TFP growth rates in the late 1990s. If we control
for lagged capital growth, however, ICT capital growth in the late 1990s
5. A long literature has, of course, explored how competition affects innovation. Aghion
et al. (2002) provide recent theoretical and empirical work and suggest that over some
range, greater competition raises innovation.14 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
was negatively correlated with contemporaneous TFP growth. These
results are consistent with—indeed, predicted by—a simple model of
unmeasured complementary capital investment.
Bolstered by these encouraging results for the United States, we ask
whether complementary capital accumulation can explain the missing
TFP growth in the United Kingdom in the second half of the 1990s.
The aggregate data are encouraging: the United Kingdom had a huge
ICT investment boom in the late 1990s—by some measures, a larger
boom than the one labeled historic in the United States over the same
period. The United Kingdom had had much lower ICT investment in
the early 1990s due to a severe recession. And the U.S. results say that cur-
rent TFP growth is positively correlated with lagged investment but neg-
atively correlated with current investment—and on both counts
measured U.K. TFP growth should have been low in the late 1990s.
However, results using industry-level U.K. data are more mixed. TFP
growth does not appear correlated with lagged ICT capital growth, which
could mean that lagged ICT capital growth is a poor proxy for unob-
served U.K. complementary capital accumulation. Contemporaneously,
rising ICT capital growth is positively, not negatively, correlated with the
industry's TFP acceleration, although ICT investment growth (as the proxy
for unobserved complementary investment) is negatively correlated. If
the lags between ICT investment and unobserved complementary invest-
ment are shorter in the United Kingdom, then this finding, too, is consis-
tent with the GPT story. However, the magnitude of the negative
investment effect is too small to explain the pervasive TFP slowdown in
U.K. industries. On the other hand, our results do suggest, albeit tenta-
tively, that the United Kingdom could see an acceleration in TFP growth
over the next decade.
In sum, we search for suspects in this case of the missing U.K. pro-
ductivity growth. The crime is of particular interest because the most
obvious suspect—differences in labor and product market regulations—
appears to be absent from the scene. In our search for clues, we ask which
sectors account for the productivity acceleration in the U.S. data,
and explore whether those same sectors show an acceleration in the United
Kingdom. We explore the role of ICT in the United States and the United
Kingdom.
Although our tentative and incomplete answer to the puzzle empha-
sizes explanation 8—the GPT nature of ICT capital, and the different tim-
ing of U.S. and U.K. investment in ICT—more than one of the suspects
may have conspired in the crime. For example, our explanation takes as
given U.K. complementary investment and leaves open the question ofThe Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 15
why the timing differs. Other suspects may bear greater responsibility for
that situation.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 compares
recent U.S. and U.K. macroeconomic experience and makes some
broader observations on the U.S. versus European experiences. Section
3 presents data and basic TFP results and also discusses some aug-
mented growth accounting. Section 4 focuses more specifically on the
potential role of information technology as a GPT. Section 5 provides
empirical evidence on the importance of ICT in the United States and
the United Kingdom, and provides some preliminary empirical results
suggesting that the GPT story fits at least some of the facts. Section
6 concludes.
2. Comparative U.S., U.K., and Continental European
Macroeconomic Performance
2.1 THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
The U.S. economy performed admirably in many dimensions in the late
1990s. As Table 1 shows, output growth rose, investment surged, inflation
moderated, and unemployment rates fell to levels that seemed implausi-
ble just a few years earlier. Many commentators attributed this macro-
economic strength to rapid productivity growth—linked particularly to
information technology—which rose at a rate nearly double that of the
preceding years. For example, the Council of Economic Advisers (2001,
page. 245) stated that:
The economy this expansion has created is not just greater in sheer size but
"new" in its structure and performance. It is dramatically more information
intensive and more technology driven, more productive and more innovative.
Today's economy utilizes new, more efficient business practices and has redefined
many traditional relationships between suppliers, manufacturers, investors, and
customers to achieve ever-greater efficiency. The cumulative result of these trends
and their interactions is a New Economy, one that is currently providing
Americans of all walks of life the benefits of high growth, low inflation, high pro-
ductivity, rising incomes, and low unemployment.
As Table 1 shows, however, the United Kingdom shared many of
these desirable macroeconomic features. Output rose more quickly than
in the preceding period, investment boomed, unemployment rates fell
sharply, inflation moderated. But in the United Kingdom, productivity
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performance. Both labor and total factor productivity grew more slowly
in the second half of the 1990s than in the first half.
2.2 BROADER REFLECTIONS ON EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE
AND DIVERGENCE
Van Ark et al. (2002) provide a fairly comprehensive comparison of the
European Union (E.U.) and the United States, using aggregate national
accounts data. Their results cover 12 of the 15 E.U. countries, comprising
95 percent of E.U. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2000 (Belgium,
Luxembourg, and Greece are excluded), for 1980-2000. They find that
labor and total factor productivity grew much faster in the European
Union than in the United States in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s.
Labor productivity rose by nearly 2M% per year, about IK percentage
points faster than in the United States. But in the second half of the 1990s,
productivity decelerated in Europe, while the opposite occurred in the
United States. As a result, in 1995-2000, labor productivity grew about
 3A
percentage point per year faster in the United States than in the European
Union.
With more detailed growth accounting, van Ark et al. find that some of
this U.S. advantage reflected the higher contribution to labor productivity
from ICT use, and some reflected a larger contribution of ICT production
to TFP growth. But another important factor was that TFP growth in the
non-ICT part of the economy fell sharply in Europe but rose in the United
States. As we shall see, our consideration of the United Kingdom and the
United States shows the same picture.
The recent divergence reflects a reversal in convergence forces. Until the
1990s, labor productivity generally grew more rapidly in Europe than in
the United States. The reason seemed clear: the European productivity
level was lower, so the Europeans were catching up. Table 2 shows that, in
1999, the level of labor productivity in the market sector of the United
Kingdom lagged France and Germany as well as the United States. In par-
ticular, the United States led the United Kingdom by 39 percent, France by
22 percent, and Germany by 19 percent.
Intuitively, it is easier to grow when all you have to do is copy a suc-
cessful example. And the neoclassical growth model predicts that coun-
tries with a lower level of capital will grow faster along the transition
path. From this perspective, it was a surprise when the productivity gap
between the United States and Europe started to widen again starting in
about 1995.
Many popular accounts stress the U.S. strength in basic science and
technological innovation. In addition, a vibrant venture capital industry is
always eager to commercialize the results of the latest research. Hence,18 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN












1. Market sector is GDP, excluding public administration and defense, health, housing, and education, per
hour worked, measured at purchasing power parities.
Source: O'Mahony and de Boer (2002, Table 7).
one popular interpretation of the productivity acceleration is that the
United States benefited from rapid leading-edge creation of knowledge in
producing high-tech goods; other industries then benefited from the pre-
sumed relatively cost-free adoption of these new technologies, i.e., by cap-
ital deepening.
Such an account is not altogether compelling. First, some of the basic
technological innovations were, in fact, European in origin. For example,
if any one person can be said to have invented the World Wide Web, that
person was an Englishman, Tim Berners-Lee (not Al Gore). In the 1980s,
Berners-Lee created the essential elements of the Web—URLs, HTML,
HTTP, and Web browser and Web server programs—while employed at
CERN, the European center for research in particle physics.
6
Second, if the difference were just science and basic innovation, with
technology adoption by other sectors, one could reasonably expect the
revival to diffuse relatively quickly—e.g., personal computers (PCs) and
other new technologies developed in the United States could be quickly
installed in Europe as well. In other words, if the issue were simply that
the ideas were initially developed and implemented in the United States,
then the European failure to experience a comparable revival would be
particularly puzzling.
Third, as we discuss in Section 3, much of the measured productivity
acceleration reflects an acceleration in TFP in sectors other than those pro-
ducing ICT. So the U.S. story goes beyond simple capital deepening,
which in principle could be easily replicated elsewhere.
6. See Berners-Lee (1999). Of course, the Web relies on the Internet, which provides the
physical infrastructure and low-level software protocols like TCP/IP. In the 1970s, the
U.S. Defense Department funded the Internet, and initially its commercial use was
banned. But the government did not claim ownership of the intellectual property, and it
permitted key personnel to quit and set up companies to exploit the new technology
(Abbade, 1999).The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 19
If the U.S. advantage is not simply its capability in basic science and
technological innovation, then what is it? As we discuss later, many sto-
ries of the benefits of ICT emphasize that adopting new technologies
requires substantial complementary investments (such as reorganiza-
tions) and co-inventions. Gust and Marquez (2002), following Greenspan
(2000) and Feldstein (2001), promote essentially this story in arguing that
labor and product market regulations prevent many countries in Europe
from benefiting fully from new technologies because the regulations
inhibit necessary reorganizations.
2.3 STRUCTURAL REFORM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
If the United Kingdom has not yet benefited from ICT to the same extent
the United States has, it is not because of inflexible labor markets, bur-
densome regulation, or the dead hand of government control of indus-
try—all those factors summed up under the label "Eurosclerosis." The
United Kingdom now ranks highly on measures of competitiveness, labor
market flexibility, ease of starting a business, and freedom from burden-
some regulations; in all these areas, Card and Freeman (2001) argue that
the United Kingdom's rank is similar, and sometimes superior, to that
of the United States.
Why does the United Kingdom appear to have a more flexible economy
than does continental Europe? The rise of Margaret Thatcher to power in
1979 set in motion an extensive program of structural reform. This pro-
gram continued under her Conservative successor, John Major, prime
minister from 1990 to 1997. The elements of reform most relevant in the
present context were fivefold. First, the government abandoned the
attempt to control inflation through wage and price controls; these meth-
ods had been employed in increasingly restrictive form since the 1950s
but had become particularly important in the aftermath of the first oil
shock in 1973. Second, it reduced the legal privileges of the trade unions
(e.g., secondary picketing was banned), while also increasing the rights of
individual members vis-a-vis their own union (e.g., requiring ballots
before strikes could be called). Third, it began privatizing the "command-
ing heights" of the British economy—steel and telecommunications, and
later the utilities (gas, electricity, and the water supply), coal mining, and
the railways. Where elements of natural monopoly existed, as in telecom-
munications and the utilities, independent regulators were set up. Fourth,
it announced that it would cease to "bale out lame ducks": no company
was now "too important to fail." This new policy was largely adhered to
and was cemented by selling off commercial companies that had for
various reasons fallen into government ownership (e.g., Rolls Royce,
British Aerospace, British Airways, and the United Kingdom's national20 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
champion in the car industry, then known as British Leyland). Fifth, finan-
cial markets were deregulated and almost all exchange controls were
abolished.
The Labour government that came to power in 1997 announced in
advance that it did not intend to reverse the reforms of the Thatcher-
Major period. It has continued the process of privatization. For example,
air traffic control services are now supplied by a private company, not a
government agency as in the United States. Immediately after it came to
power, the new government gave the Bank of England operational inde-
pendence in monetary policy. A Monetary Policy Committee was estab-
lished at the Bank with the remit of meeting a target for inflation set by
the chancellor of the exchequer: this target was (and has continued to be)
2.5% per annum as measured by the Retail Prices Index excluding mort-
gage interest payments (RPIX). The new government also announced a
framework of rules for fiscal policy.
Apart from law and order, defense, health, and education, the govern-
ment owns or directly controls little of the economy. In 1999, less than 30%
of the labor force were members of a trade union, down from 50% in 1980;
collective-bargaining agreements now cover fewer than 36% of the labor
force, down from 68%, over the same period (Nickell and Quintini, 2001).
The bulk of union members work in the public sector; as in the United
States, private sector union membership is now quite low. The kind of
regulation found in some European countries, which makes it costly to
close plants, does not exist in the United Kingdom.
In sum, as Card and Freeman (2001) argue, the United Kingdom's
reform program has reversed the process of relative economic decline
that became apparent in the 1960s and 1970s.
7 Nor does weak U.K. pro-
ductivity performance reflect a failure of macroeconomic policy.
Inflation peaked at an annual rate of about 9%% in late 1990 but then
declined steadily toward what became the target rate of 2.5% in mid-
1997; since then, inflation has fluctuated in a narrow range. The unem-
ployment rate (the internationally comparable International Labour
Organization definition) peaked in early 1993 at 10.7% and has been
reduced by half since.
Lest this should seem too rosy a picture, one long-standing weakness
continues to hamper the U.K. economy: a low level of skills (see Table 3).
In 1999, the share of the U.K. labor force with a college degree or higher
was little more than half the U.S. share. Although the U.K. share was sim-
7. The underlying weaknesses of the U.K. economy and the extent to which these have been
alleviated by policy are discussed in Bean and Crafts (1996), Oulton (1995), and Crafts and
O'Mahony (2001). O'Mahony and de Boer (2002) compare productivity levels and growth
rates across countries.The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 21
ilar to France and Germany, the U.K. proportion with vocational qualifi-
cations was also much lower.
Other aspects of policy may also be relevant. For example, some have
argued that U.K. town and country planning laws limit the expansion of
new forms of retailing (Lovegrove et al., 1998). More generally, Nickell
(1996) argues that competition promotes productivity growth. But histori-
cally, U.K. law has been much more lenient toward uncompetitive behav-
ior than has been the case in the United States. (This situation may now be
changing with the coming into force in 2000 of the 1998 Competition Act.)
3. Data and Preliminary Empirical Results
We begin with results from standard growth accounting to establish some
stylized facts. Doing so will help us dismiss a few potential explanations
for the productivity divergence and hence help motivate our later focus
on the general-purpose nature of ICT.
We focus on disaggregated, industry-level results for total factor pro-
ductivity. Even if one is interested in aggregate outcomes, such a disag-
gregated approach is helpful. Any number of stories can be told to explain
a single time series like GDP or GDP per worker. It is often difficult to
reject a particular hypothesis using just aggregate data. Here sectoral and
industry data can help. In addition, if one wishes to explore the differ-
ences between the ICT-producing and ICT-using sectors, then it is natural
to disaggregate.
In this section, first we describe briefly our datasets; then we discuss
results. Finally, we consider and reject several sources of measurement
error as explanations for our results.
3.1 U.S. DATA
We use a 51-industry dataset that updates one used in Bosworth and
Triplett (2002) and Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001). For industry gross
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output and intermediate-input use, we use industry-level national
accounts data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). For capital
input—including detailed ICT data—we use Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) capital input data by disaggregated industry. For labor input, we
use unpublished BLS data on hours worked by two-digit industry. Gross




Several issues should be kept in mind. First, we do not have industry
measures of labor quality, only raw hours. We do incorporate an aggre-
gate adjustment for labor quality in our top-line numbers, using an index
calculated by Aaronson and Sullivan (2001). (Their index is relatively
close to that produced by the BLS.) Second, the BE A industry data come
from the income-side of the national accounts, which accelerated faster
than the expenditure side in the late 1990s, as is well known. It is not clear
which side of the national accounts is more reliable; the Council of
Economic Advisers, for example, takes an agnostic view and uses a geo-
metric average for growth accounting. This approach is not possible with
industry-level data.
The detailed industry definitions differ a bit from those in the
United Kingdom. To simplify comparisons in summary tables, we
aggregate to approximately a one-digit level, where definitions are rea-
sonably close.
3.2 U.K. DATA
We use a new industry dataset, developed at the Bank of England, con-
taining data for 34 industries spanning the whole U.K. economy and
running from 1979 to 2000.
1
0 For each industry, we have gross output
8. We thank Jack Triplett for sending us the industry dataset that merged the BEA and BLS
data. We updated the BEA data to incorporate November 2002 national income and
product account (NIPA) industry revisions and also removed owner-occupied housing.
The BEA labor compensation data do not include proprietors or the self-employed, so we
follow Bosworth and Triplett in using BLS data that correct for these omissions. We thank
Larry Rosenblum at the BLS for sending us unpublished industry hours data, which
makes adjustments for estimated hours worked by nonproduction and supervisory
employees as well as the self-employed. We updated the BLS capital data from
http://www.bls.gov/web/prod3.supp.toc.htm (accessed December 2002). We follow
Bosworth and Triplett and exclude several service sectors where consistent input or out-
put data are unavailable: holding and other investment offices, social services, member-
ship organizations, and other services. We do include those industries in the ICT
capital-by-industry data reported later in the paper.
9. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002) use different industry data sources; unfortunately, their
dataset was not publicly available as of November 2003. The Brookings Institution (2002)
discusses key differences across datasets.
10. Outton and Srinivasan (2003b) describes the industry input, output, and ICT capital data
and is available on request.The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 23
and inputs of capital services, labor services, and intermediates, in
both nominal and real terms. Capital services cover three types of ICT
and four types of non-ICT capital. The non-ICT assets are structures,
plant and machinery (equipment), vehicles, and intangibles. The three
ICT assets are computers, software, and communications equipment.
The real capital input index is a rental-price weighted average of the
growth rates of these asset stocks. The real intermediate index is a
weighted average of purchases from all the other industries and from
imports.
Labor services are measured as hours worked and are built up in sev-
eral steps. First, we estimate total usual hours for each industry. Second,
we apply two aggregate adjustments. The first is to constrain the growth
of total hours to conform with the official index of aggregate hours
worked. This method allows for cyclical variability in hours, though at the
same rate in all industries. The second aggregate adjustment is to apply a
correction for changes in labor quality, mainly due to rising levels of edu-
cational attainment (quality change is discussed below).
Prior to several adjustments described below, the dataset is reasonably
consistent with the official U.K. national accounts in both real and nomi-
nal terms, which is important because otherwise any story based on
industry data will not be convincing as an explanation of what is hap-
pening at the macro level.
For making comparisons with the United States, we need to use the
same methodology to derive ICT capital services in both countries.
Therefore we assume that computers and software depreciate geometri-
cally at rates similar to those used in studies of the United States
(e.g., Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000), which are in turn based on those used
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. We also employ U.S. price indices,
converted to sterling terms, to deflate investment in current prices. U.S.
ICT price indices generally fall faster than those in the United Kingdom,
which means that our ICT capital and investment measures will grow
more rapidly. The United Kingdom is also an ICT producer, so we have
made corresponding adjustments to the growth rates of output of the ICT
industries.
In addition, we have made a large adjustment to the official nominal
level of software investment, multiplying it by a factor of 3, for reasons
discussed by Oulton (2001b) and (2002). Compared with the United
States, official software investment is very low relative to computer
investment, and a much lower proportion of the sales of the computer
services industry is classified as investment. The "times 3" adjustment
can be justified as putting the two countries on the same footing
methodologically.24 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
3.3 EXONERATING TWO OF THE SUSPECTS
We briefly expand on two broad data issues related to the challenge of
cross-country data comparability. First, the official U.K. statistics do not
control for hedonics in the same way or to the same degree that the U.S.
national accounts do. Second, the United Kingdom had an even larger
decline in unemployment than the United States did, which could
reduce overall productivity if those pulled into the labor force have
lower-than-average skills and productivity. Neither story explains the
divergent performance of U.K. and U.S. productivity because, as noted
above, our U.K. industry data incorporate adjustments for these two
issues.
First, what difference do the computer hedonics make? National
accounts in Europe (including the United Kingdom), have, so far,
lagged in introducing satisfactory methods for measuring ICT, leading
to implausibly large variation across countries in computer price
indices (Schreyer, 2002). Indeed, the main weakness of U.S. methods of
measuring ICT is that they don't go far enough. For example, there is
no true price index for investment in custom and own account software
(two-thirds of the total), only for prepackaged software (Parker and
Grimm, 2000). And within telecommunications, hedonic methods are
only just starting to be introduced (Grimm, Moulton, and Wasshausen,
2002).
A related issue is that, although measured GDP in both Europe and
the United States now includes software investment, different method-
ologies lead to substantial differences in estimated levels (Lequiller,
2001). Hence, cross-country comparisons again need to use a compara-
ble methodology.
Most researchers have dealt with these issues by applying as far as pos-
sible U.S. methods to other countries. However, this approach does not
necessarily transform European productivity performance because inputs
as well as output grow faster (see again Schreyer, 2002). Oulton (2001b)
finds that U.S. methodology raises the growth rate of U.K. GDP by about
one-third of a percentage point per annum in the last half of the 1990s.




Second, why isn't declining labor quality quantitatively important in
explaining the divergence? We apply an index of U.K. labor quality (con-
11. Gust and Marquez (2000) and van Ark et al. (2002) also find that differences in national
accounts methodology cannot explain the productivity growth gap between the United
States and Europe.The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 25
structed by Burriel-Llombart and Jones, 2004). As is standard, we define
labor quality as the growth of quality-adjusted labor input minus the
growth of unweighted total hours.
1
2 The unemployed do tend to have
below-average skills or qualifications and falling unemployment indeed
contributed to a lower growth rate of labor quality from the first to the
second half of the 1990s. But other factors affected U.K. labor quality, such
as increasing female participation; declining participation by older,
unskilled men; and (of particular importance) the retirement or death of
older, less qualified people and their replacement by younger, better qual-
ified workers. In both countries, we find that labor quality growth was




3.4 RESULT FROM TRADITIONAL GROWTH ACCOUNTING
Tables 4 and 5 provide standard estimates of TFP for various aggregates,
including the one-digit industry level. The first three columns show TFP
in gross-output terms. Since aggregate TFP is a value-added concept, we
present industry TFP in value-added terms as well; by controlling for dif-
ferences in intermediate input intensity, these figures are scaled to be




We start by discussing the U.S. results in Table 4, focusing on the
value-added measures. The top line shows the sizable acceleration in
TFP growth, from about 0.6% per year to about 1.9%.
1
5 These calcula-
tions incorporate labor quality adjustments from Aaronson and
Sullivan (2001), shown in the second line. Labor quality growth grew
more slowly in the second half of the 1990s, when the booming econ-
omy drew lower skilled workers into employment. Hence, adjusting for
12. Quality-adjusted hours is a Tornqvist index of hours worked by 40 groups, where each
group's hours are weighted by its share of the aggregate wage bill. The groups consist of
four qualifications groups (degree, A level, O level, and "other") and five age groups
(covering ages 16-65), for each gender.
13. See the second line in both Tables 4 and 5. It is labeled "(adjusted for labor quality)."
14. With Tornqvist aggregation, aggregate TFP growth is a weighted average of industry
gross-output TFP growth, where the so-called Domar weights equal nominal indus-
try gross output divided by aggregate value added; the weights thus total more than
1. In continuous time, this is equivalent to first converting gross-output residuals to
value-added terms by dividing by (1 minus the intermediate share), and then using
shares in nominal value added. (In discrete time, using average shares from adjacent
periods, they are approximately equivalent.) Basu and Fernald (2001) discuss this
aggregation and its extension to the case of imperfect competition; see also Oulton
(2001a).
15. As noted earlier, the acceleration exceeds that in the product-side BLS data shown in
Table 1.o
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labor quality growth heightens the magnitude of the TFP acceleration
calculated with raw hours (shown in the third line, calculated as the
appropriate weighted average of the industry TFP growth rates shown
in the table).
The remainder of the table shows various subaggregates (none of
which incorporate a labor quality adjustment), including the one-digit
SIC level. Our dataset shows clearly that acceleration was not limited
to the ICT-producing sectors. First, if we focus on the non-ICT pro-
ducing sectors (third line from the bottom), they show an acceleration
of nearly one percentage point. In an accounting sense, these sectors
contribute about 0.9 percentage points of the 1.2 percentage point total
(non-quality-adjusted) acceleration. Major non-ICT sectors contribut-
ing to the acceleration include wholesale trade, retail trade, finance,
and insurance.
Second, Griliches (1994) and Nordhaus (2002) argue that real output in
many service industries is poorly measured—e.g., it is often difficult
even conceptually to decide on the real output of a bank or a lawyer; as
another example, in health care, the hedonic issues are notoriously diffi-
cult. Nordhaus argues for focusing on what one hopes are the well-
measured (or at least, better measured) sectors of the economy. The
acceleration in TFP in well-measured industries is even larger than the
overall acceleration; the acceleration is sizable even when we exclude
ICT-producing sectors.
Table 5 shows the comparable table for the U.K. economy. Between
the first and second halves of the 1990s, productivity growth fell in the
U.K. private nonfarm economy by about one percentage point, even
after adjusting for the much slower growth in labor quality in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s. Looking at major industries, TFP growth (unad-
justed for labor quality) rose substantially in finance/insurance and
manufacturing durables, but it was flat or it declined in most other
major sectors.
By contrast, aggregate productivity growth rose in the United States by
1.3 percentage points per annum (Table 4), so the difference in accelera-
tion was about 2.3 percentage points. Given this broad difference, there
are some similarities in the sectoral pattern across the two countries. For
example, the productivity acceleration was much faster in durables than
in nondurables; finance and insurance surged.
A closer look at the sectoral data shows a major difference
between the United States and the United Kingdom in the trade sec-
tors, especially retail. U.S. retail value-added TFP growth rose by 4.5
percentage points per year; U.K. TFP growth fell by about 1.7 percentage
points.The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 31
Nevertheless, they are not the entire story. Even excluding them, the




The fact that the U.S. productivity acceleration was broadbased is con-
sistent with a growing body of recent work. For example, the Council of
Economic Advisers (2003) reports that between 1973-1995 to 1995-2002,
non-ICT TFP accelerated sharply, with its contribution to U.S. growth ris-
ing from 0.18 percentage points per year to 1.25 percentage points,
roughly in line with the figures here.
1
7 Bosworth and Triplett (2002) focus
on the performance of service industries and find a widespread accelera-
tion. Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2002) also find that TFP accelerated out-
side ICT production, although by a smaller amount.
3.5 AUGMENTED GROWTH-ACCOUNTING CONSIDERATIONS
Some researchers have investigated whether the results cited here are
robust to deviations from the standard assumptions of growth account-
ing, generally concluding that they are. Using different methodologies,
Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001); the Council of Economic Advisers (var-
ious years); and Baily and Lawrence (2001) find that cyclical mismeasure-
ment of inputs plays little if any role in the U.S. acceleration of the late
1990s. Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001) also find little role in the pro-
ductivity acceleration for deviations from constant returns and perfect
competition.
Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro (2001) do find a noticeable role for tradi-
tional adjustment costs associated with investment. Because investment
rose sharply in the late 1990s, firms were presumably diverting an increas-
ing amount of worker time to installing the new capital rather than pro-
ducing marketable output. In other words, if adjusting the capital stock
incurs costs and faster growth leads to higher costs, then true technologi-
cal progress was faster than measured. These considerations strengthen
the conclusion that the technology acceleration was broadbased because
16. Wholesale and retail trade account for about three-quarters of the U.S. acceleration
(Domar weighted industry TFP growth) and one-third of the U.K. deceleration. The
McKinsey Global Institute (2001) provides anecdotal as well as quantitative evidence on
the transformation of wholesale and retail trade; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2002)
link the retail industry data to firm-level developments. Note that lorgenson, Ho, and
Stiroh (2002), who use output data from the BLS Office of Employment Projections, do
not find as important a contribution from the trade sectors.
17. The CEA methodology is very similar to that of Oliner and Sichel (2002), who report no TFP
acceleration outside ICT production. But Oliner and Sichel discount their finding on this
score because their method takes non-ICT TFP as a residual. Because the Oliner and Sichel
endpoint is a recession year, 2001, they point out that any cyclical effects on productivity
are forced to show up in non-ICT TFP. In addition, the CEA measure of labor productivity
is a geometric average of income- and product-side measures of output per hour.32 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
service and trade industries invested heavily in the late 1990s and hence
paid a lot of investment adjustment costs.
The United Kingdom had even more sharply rising investment than
did the United States, so conceivably adjustment costs might be masking
an underlying improvement in U.K. productivity growth. From
1990-1995, aggregate investment in the U.K. private nonfarm economy
fell at 0.45% per year; over 1995-2000, it rose at 8.60% per year.
1
8 So how
much of the decline in U.K. productivity growth might be attributable to
adjustment costs? Following Basu, Fernald and Shapiro (2001), we cali-
brate these costs as a parameter § times the growth rate of investment; fol-
lowing Shapiro (1986), they take (j) to be 0.035.
1
9 This calibration implies
that investment adjustment costs held down measured TFP growth by
about 0.30 percentage points per year over 1995-2000, but boosted it by
0.02 percentage points over 1990-1995. Hence, the slowdown in true pro-
ductivity growth was about 0.63, not 0.95, percentage points per annum,
and adjustment costs might account for about one-third of the observed
productivity deceleration.
Of course, the same correction would raise the U.S. technology acceler-
ation by a bit under 0.2 percentage point.
2
0 Hence, although this correction
makes a larger difference to the U.K. data, it doesn't reverse the U.K.
decline or even noticeably narrow the gap with the United States.
4. Industry-Level Productivity Implications oflCT
as a New GPT
The U.S. productivity acceleration coincided with accelerated price
declines for computers and semiconductors but, as we just saw, most of
the TFP acceleration appears to have taken place outside ICT production.
Can ICT somehow explain the measured TFP acceleration in industries
using ICT? We first discuss broad theoretical considerations of treating
ICT as a new general-purpose technology (GPT) and then present a sim-
ple model to clarify the issues and empirical implications.
18. This estimate uses the same data employed to estimate capital services in the United
Kingdom at the industry level.
19. Shapiro does not estimate different values of (|) for IT and non-IT capital; one could imag-
ine that the values differ. We hope to estimate these values in future work.
20. These numbers are qualitatively the same but smaller than those reported in Basu,
Fernald, and Shapiro (2001) for three reasons. First, we have added an extra year of data
(2000) in which investment growth was weak. Second, data revisions have reduced the
growth rate of investment in the second half of the 1990s. Third, Jason Cummins and
John Roberts pointed out a mistake in our conversion from Shapiro (1986)'s framework
to ours. This led us to reduce our estimate of ty from 0.048 in Basu, Fernald, and Shapiro
(2001) to 0.035 in this work.The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 33
4.1 GENERAL-PURPOSE TECHNOLOGIES: "SPOOKY ACTION
AT A DISTANCE"
Standard neoclassical growth accountants identify several effects of ICT
on aggregate labor and total factor productivity growth. Faster TFP
growth in producing ICT contributes directly to aggregate TFP. In addition,
the use of ICT contributes directly to labor productivity through capital
deepening: by reducing the user cost of capital, falling ICT prices induce
firms to increase their desired capital stock.
2
1
Standard growth accounting does not presume that the use of ICT has
any particular effect on TFP. By contrast, many microeconomic, firm-level,
and anecdotal studies suggest that there are important—but often indirect
and hard to foresee—potential roles for ICT to affect measured produc-
tion and productivity in sectors using ICT. Conceptually, one can separate
these potential links into two categories: purposeful co-invention, which
we interpret as the accumulation of complementary capital, which in turn
leads to mismeasurement of true technology; and externalities of one sort
or another.
These indirect effects arising from general-purpose technologies such
as ICT are akin to what Einstein, in the context of particle physics, called
"spooky action at a distance": quantum physics predicts that, in some cir-
cumstances, actions performed on a particle in one location instanta-
neously influence another particle that is arbitrarily far away. In terms of
the effects of ICT, an innovation in one sector, ICT, often causes unex-
pected ripples of co-invention and co-investment in sectors that seem
almost arbitrarily far away. Many of the GPT stories (e.g., Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg, 1995; Helpman and Trajtenberg, 1998) fall in the "spooky
action" camp. (Of course, Einstein's spooky action was instantaneous; the
effects of GPTs are not.)
First, firm-level studies suggest that benefiting from ICT investments
requires substantial and costly co-investments in complementary capi-
tal.
2
2 For example, firms that use computers more intensively may reor-
ganize production, thereby creating intangible capital in the form of
organizational knowledge. These investments may include resources
diverted to learning; they may involve purposeful innovation arising
from research and development (R&D). As Bresnahan (undated) argues,
21. Tevlin and Whelan (2000) and Bakhshi et al. (2003) provide econometric evidence for the
United States and the United Kingdom, respectively, that falling relative prices of ICT
equipment fueled the ICT investment boom.
22. See, for example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2000) and Bresnahan (undated) for a discussion
of the kinds of complementary investments and co-invention that firms undertake to
benefit from ICT, given its general-purpose attributes. David and Wright (1999) provide
a historical reflection on general-purpose technologies.34 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
"[A]dvances in ICT shift the innovation possibility frontier of the econ-
omy rather than directly shifting the production frontier;" that is, ICT
induces co-innovation and co-investment by firms using the technology,
with long and variable lags.
The resulting organizational capital is analogous to physical capital
because companies accumulate it in a purposeful way. Conceptually, we
can think of this complementary capital as an additional input into a
standard neoclassical production function; it differs from ordinary cap-




Second, the GPT literature suggests the likelihood of sizable externali-
ties to ICT. For example, successful new managerial ideas—including
those that take advantage of ICT, such as the use of a new business infor-
mation system—seem likely to diffuse to other firms. Imitation is often
easier and less costly than the initial co-invention of, say, a new organiza-
tion change because you learn by watching and analyzing the experi-
mentation, the successes, and the mistakes made by others.
2
4 Indeed,
firms that don't use computers more intensively may also benefit from
spillovers of intangible capital. For example, if there are sizable spillovers
to R&D, and if R&D is more productive with better computers, then even
firms that don't use computers intensively may benefit from the knowl-
edge created by computers.
These GPT considerations are completely consistent with the tradi-
tional growth accounting framework but suggest difficulties in implemen-
tation and interpretation. In particular, these considerations suggest that
the production function is mismeasured because we don't observe all
inputs (the service flow from complementary, intangible capital) or all
outputs (the investment in complementary capital). Hence, TFP is mis-
measured.
Note that the spooky action nature of the co-inventions and externali-
ties suggests that we should not expect the benefits of ICT to diffuse
quickly across borders. First, if large complementary investments and
innovations are necessary, diffusion will inevitably take time. Second,
Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) note that co-invention often requires
23. Much of Brynjolfsson's work tries to quantify the role of unobserved complementary
capital. Macroeconomic studies of the effects of organizational capital include
Greenwood and Yorokoglu (1997), Hornstein and Krusell (1996), Hall (2001), and Laitner
and Stolyarov (2001).
24. Bresnahan (undated) discusses the channels for externalities to operate. Bresnahan and
Trajtenberg (1995) highlight both vertical externalities (between general-purpose tech-
nology producers and each application sector) and horizontal externalities (across appli-
cation sectors).The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 35
"coordination between agents located far from each other along the time
and technology dimension" (p. 3), so that institutional arrangements and
market structure—which affect the ability to contract successfully in an
environment with asymmetric information and uncertain property
rights—are likely to matter; these factors are likely to differ across coun-
tries. Third, adoption costs may differ across countries, just as they seem
to differ across firms, so that low adjustment/adoption cost countries
may adopt new technologies first. These differences in cost may reflect the
presence or absence of complementary factors—business school-trained
managers, for example—or the vintage structure of the existing capital
stock.
2
5 Finally, spillover effects may be stronger at closer distances (e.g.,
within Silicon Valley).
In looking at the United States versus the United Kingdom, this dis-
cussion makes clear the difficulty of the task at hand: we need to find a
way to infer unobserved complementary investments. That is, the
United States could be benefiting from past intangible investments in
knowledge and reorganization, leading to high measured TFP growth;
the United Kingdom might have begun heavy intangible complemen-
tary investment only more recently, diverting resources from produc-
tion of market output and appearing to have low TFP growth. We now
turn to a formal model that suggests variables that might act as proxies
for these unobservables.
4.2 INDUSTRY-LEVEL IMPLICATIONS OF ICT AS A NEW GPT:
A SIMPLE MODEL
The last ten years, and especially the last five, have seen an explosion in
papers modeling the effects of general-purpose technologies (GPTs) and
interpreting the ICT revolution as the advent of such technology.
2
6 But it
is quite difficult to derive industry-level empirical implications from this
literature. For example, it is often unclear how to measure in practice
some of the key variables, such as unobserved investment and capital;
25. Chandler (1977), for example, highlights the rise of professional managerial skills. In
addition, new technologies may be somewhat specific to a country's particular cul-
tural and institutional arrangements—society's general organization, infrastructure,
social capital, and the like. In other words, appropriate technology may matter even
in comparisons of U.S. versus U.K. companies. This is related to the literature on fac-
tors that affect the costs of adopting a new GPT. Helpman and Trajtenberg (1998), for
example, have some interesting examples of which industries adopted semiconduc-
tors first—e.g., hearing aids and computers, where the existing technology was inad-
equate—and which adapted late, notably telecom and automotives, with a large body
of vintage capital.
26. An incomplete list is Caselli (1999), Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), the collection of
papers edited by Helpman (1998), Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001), Jovanovic and Rousseau
(2003), and Laitner and Stolyarov (2001).36 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
and even for observed variables, measurement conventions often depart
from those used in national accounting.
2
7
On the other hand, conventional industry-level growth-accounting
studies of the sort reviewed and extended in Section 3 are typically hard
to interpret in terms of GPT considerations because they generally lack a
conceptual, general equilibrium framework to interpret movements in
TFP. Although some studies try to look for a "new economy" in which
ICT has indirect effects on measured TFP in ICT-using industries, in the
absence of clear theoretical guidance, it is not clear that many would not
know if they had, in fact, found it.
Finally, as discussed above, a large empirical literature, often using
firm-level data or case studies, stresses the importance and costly
nature of organizational change accompanying ICT investment. This
literature, while important and insightful, rarely makes contact with
economywide productivity research.
2
8 In many ways, our empirical
work below is a tentative attempt to make just that connection. The
model below provides the bare bones of a theoretical framework to cap-
ture some of the key issues, focusing on cross-industry empirical impli-
cations. Our model takes as given the arrival of a particular GPT, which
here is taken to be the production of ICT capital at a continuously
falling relative price. The distinguishing feature of a GPT is that its
effects are general—going well beyond the industry of production—but
require complementary investments by firms for its use to be truly ben-
eficial. For empirical implementation, we focus on industries that use
the GPT.
Value added in industries that use, but do not produce, IT is given by
29:
Qlt = Y, + Ait = F(ZtG(KH,Clt),KlJ,Llt) (1)
where, i = 1 ... N, and F and G are homogeneous of degree 1 in their argu-
ments. Z is a technology term that each industry takes as exogenous. We
discuss the distinction between A and Y shortly. For simplicity, we ignore
materials input (although we add it back in our empirical work), imper-
fect competition, increasing returns, and capital adjustment costs. All
could be added, at the cost of considerable notation.
27. For example, capital is typically measured as foregone consumption, which is sensible for
an aggregative model but difficult to relate to industry-level capital accounts that deal
with capital heterogeneity and quality change by measuring (attempting to measure) cap-
ital input in efficiency units. Howitt (1998) attempts to bridge the two conventions.
28. An exception is Brynjolfsson and Yang (2001).
29. With constant returns and competition, one can speak of firms and industries inter-
changeably. "An industry does x" is our shorthand for "all firms in an industry do x."The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 37
Each industry rents ICT capital K
IT and non-ICT capital K
m in compet-





Industries must, however, individually accumulate their stocks of com-
plementary capital, C. We think of this capital as business and organiza-
tional models or training in the use of IT, and the investment flow A as the
time and resource cost of training and creating new business structures.
3
0
Industries forego producing market output Y to accumulate this capital:
C,, = Aa + (l-5c )(:*_, (3)
We assume that investment in all three kinds of capital is irreversible.
Because both A and NT investment goods cost the same to produce, the
economic difference between the two types of capital is that they interact
in different ways with the ICT capital stock. The difference from the point
of view of measurement is that Y is measured in the national income
accounts, but A is not.
3
1
The main economic implication of the separability assumption built
into equation (1) is that the marginal productivities of K
IT and C are
closely tied to one another. We assume that the elasticity of substitution
between the two inputs in the production of G is relatively small. We also
assume Inadalike conditions such that the marginal productivity of each
input is very low if the level of the other is close to zero. Thus, when the
GPT arrives and ICT capital starts getting cheap, the incentive to accu-
mulate C is also very strong.
Note that conceptually and as traditionally construed, innovation can
take two forms. First, we lump purposeful innovations into C (indeed, we
have assumed that all purposeful innovation is closely linked to ICT).
Second, we interpret Z as all exogenous increases in technology, includ-
ing, for example, the component of organizational change that spills
over from the sector of origin—for example, the idea of using individual
30. Chandler (1977) discusses innovations in inventory management made possible by rail-
roads. Wal-Mart's inventory management system provides an example of innovations
made possible by ITC.
31. Some fraction of A is probably measured, for example, consultant services and many
forms of software. It is not clear how much of what is measured is properly capitalized,
as required by equation (3).38 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
electric motors at each workstation in a factory rather than relying on the
single drive train of a steam engine.
4.3 TFP MEASUREMENT WITH UNOBSERVED INPUTS AND OUTPUT
What are the implications of complementary capital accumulation for the
measured TFP of ICT-using industries? Differentiating, we can write the
production function in growth rates as:
Aq = -^— Ak
IT + -£j- Ac + -^— Ak
NT + -^- Al + sGAz (4)
Because we have made Solow's assumptions of constant returns to scale




If we observed total output Q, and knew the required rates of return to
capital, we could back out the elasticity of output with respect to comple-
mentary capital, C:
Q
 [ PQ PQ PQ
 w
Without independent information on the flow of A or the stock of C (per-
haps from stock market valuations), one cannot implement this procedure
using measured output, Y
NT. Rewrite equation (6) as:





yNT yNT pyNT pyNT pyivr
Because Q/Y
NT is not observed, within broad limits we are free to believe
that complementary capital is arbitrarily important in production by
assuming that an arbitrarily large share of the true output that firms pro-
duce is not counted in the national accounts.
Some algebraic manipulations of equation (4) yield an expression for
the conventional Solow residual:
EE ATFP =
FCC AThe Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 39
We see that omitting complementary inputs can cause us either to over-
estimate or to underestimate TFP growth. When unmeasured output is
growing (Aa > 0), TFP growth is underestimated (the 1974 story) as
resources are diverted to investment. When unmeasured input is growing
(Ac > 0), TFP growth is overestimated. In a steady state, of course, the
accumulation equation implies that Ac = Aa, which in turn implies that the
steady-state mismeasurement is
r \ A~\ r
yN
where r* is the steady-state real interest rate. In a dynamically efficient
economy, the mismeasurement is necessarily positive: true steady-state
TFP growth is lower than measured, not higher.
This point is a simple one, but it is a quantitatively important correction
to statements in the existing literature (e.g., Bessen, 2003).
3
2 Of course, if
one corrects only output mismeasurement (Aa), then ICT will appear fan-
tastically productive, far beyond what is ordinarily measured. But firms
choose to divert resources to unobserved investment Aa to create an intan-
gible capital stock that contributes to future production. The resulting
unmeasured flow of capital services implies a bias in the other direction.
The net bias may be either positive or negative at a point in time, but it is
positive in the steady state.
We now seek an observable proxy for unobserved investment in, and
growth in the stock of, complementary capital. In light of the firm-level
evidence, observed growth in ICT capital provides a reasonable proxy.






We consider the optimization subproblem of producing G at minimum






T is the change in the relative rental rate of ICT capital to C cap-
ital. This equation implies a direct link between growth in complementary
capital and growth of observed ICT capital.
32. Laitner and Stolyarov (2001) also stress the importance of including complementary cap-
ital in a growth accounting exercise.40 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
We can use the accumulation equation to express unobserved invest-





Substituting the last equation and equation (8) into equation (7), we have








The first term is proportional to (r* + S - 1), so under reasonable circum-
stances it is negative. The second term, on the other hand, is clearly posi-
tive. Hence, our GPT-type framework implies that firms or industries that
invest substantially in GPTs have lower current measured output but
higher future measured output; that is, other things being equal, indus-
tries that are making large IT investments today will have low measured
TFP growth, but those that made such investments in the past will have
high measured TFP growth. (This discussion is independent of any exter-
nalities, which may also be important.)
As an estimating equation, equation (9) has the difficulty that industries
are likely to differ in their long-run C/Y
NT ratios. Using the CES assump-










In the convenient Cobb-Douglas case, the C/Y
NT ratio is proportional to
the observed ICT share; other things being equal, the mismeasurement of
complementary capital is more important in those industries where ICT
capital is used to a greater extent—a reasonable conclusion.
ATFP = [Fc - sGAz (10)
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As an alternative way of implementing equation (7), can we take ICT
investment as a direct proxy for unobserved complementary capital
investment? Combining the accumulation equations for complementary
capital and ICT capital implies:
p- = ^- + (8C - 57CT)
If 8C = 5ICT and a = 0, then Aa = Ai
ICT, which implies:
ATFP, = Fc~klt - i^j l^pj Aif
1 + sGAzfl
= Fckit - biu + sGdzit (11)
where ~iit = s\t Aif
T
Note that the capital and investment terms incorporate the income share
of complementary capital and the share of complementary investment in
output, which are likely to differ greatly across industries. So we are
assuming that the complementary shares are correlated across industries
with the ICT shares.
When is equation (10) preferable to equation (11)? The key issue is the lag
between ICT investment and complementary investment. For example, sup-
pose a company invested heavily in an expensive enterprise resource man-
agement system in the mid-1980s and then spent the next decade learning
how best to reorganize and thus benefit from the improved information
availability. Then equation (10)—with long lags—should work well. By con-
trast, if the reorganization were contemporaneous with the ICT investment,
then equation (11) should work well (assuming the other conditions involved
in deriving it are not too unreasonable) and there might not be long lags.
Our method of using cost-minimization conditions to act as proxies for
unobserved variables from observables is common in the literature on
cyclical productivity with unobserved factor input (utilization).
3
3 As in
that literature, the method can imply a fairly elaborate proxy, which may
not be easy to estimate. Given that fact, should we try to follow Hall
(2001) and several other authors, who measure the importance of organi-
zational capital from the gap between firms' stock market valuations and
the replacement values of their physical capital?
3
4
We do not do so, for two reasons. First, given the importance of the
issue, it is interesting to investigate a different approach to estimation and
see if we get roughly the same answer. Second, given the recent large
swings in equity markets, we are wary of any attempt to impute the real
33. See, for example, Basu and Kimball (1997).
34. See Brynjolfsson and Yang (2001) for an example of this alternative approach.42 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
service flow of the stock of organizational capital from stock-market val-
uations. Setting aside the usual concerns about stock-market bubbles,
suppose the recent fall in equity prices is due to the realization that much
of the current ecapital will become obsolete sooner than previously
expected. This information will appropriately lead to a lower market
value of the capital, but it does not imply that its current real service flow
into production must be lower.
3
5
4.4 EXTENSIONS TO THE BASIC FRAMEWORK
Clearly, the implications of a new GPT for measured productivity growth
are subtle and may be hard to distinguish from alternatives. But the the-
ory does suggest that one needs lags of ICT capital growth in the TFP
equation, in addition to the current growth rate.
3
6
One complication is that the externality captured in Az can be a function
of industry d as well as aggregate C. In that plausible case, one can no
longer tell whether the capital growth terms in equation (9) represent
accumulation of a private stock, or externalities that are internalized
within the industry. Similarly, if we find that lagged Ak
IT is important for
explaining current productivity growth, we do not know whether that
finding supports the theory we have outlined or whether it indicates that
the externality is a function of lagged capital.
In addition, a free parameter is the length of a period, a point on which
the theory gives us no guidance. The lagged Ak
IT may be last year's ITC
capital accumulation or the last decade's. Furthermore, equation (3) for
the accumulation of complementary capital has no adjustment costs or
time-to-build or time-to-plan lags in the accumulation of C. But such fric-
tions and lags are likely to be important in practice, making it even harder
to uncover the link between ICT and measured TFP.
One additional concern is whether other variables should enter the pro-
duction function for A, which we do not account for here. Our framework
implicitly assumes the same production function for A and Y. But it is
possible, as many have recognized, that the production of complementary
35. Formally, capital aggregation theory shows that the service flow of capital is proportional
to the value of the stock only if depreciation occurs at a constant, exponential rate.
A large, one-time capital loss is an excellent example of a nonconstant depreciation rate.
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2003) make exactly the same argument about changes in stock-
market valuation when a GPT is introduced. But given the false starts and dead ends that
often accompany a recently introduced GPT, their logic should apply equally to episodes
after the GPT is introduced but before it has become a mature technology. (Think, for
example, of DC power generation in the United States.)
36. Hence one needs to generalize the approach followed by, e.g., Stiroh (2002b), who argues
against a spillovers/GPT story by regressing TFP growth on only the current-year
growth rate of IT capital. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) also find significant lags in firm-
level data, which dovetails our more aggregative evidence.The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 43
capital is particularly intensive in skilled (i.e., college-educated) labor.
3
7
This hypothesis is particularly interesting given the noticeable difference
between the United States and the United Kingdom in the fraction of
skilled workers that we documented in Table 3. If true, the hypothesis
implies that the relative price of accumulating complementary capital
may differ significantly between the two countries (and perhaps among
industries within a country) in ways that we may not be able to capture.
5. Evidence for the GPT Hypothesis
5.1 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF ICT
We concluded earlier that much of the U.S. acceleration in measured TFP
reflects an acceleration outside the production of ICT products. TFP can
move around for many reasons unrelated to ICT. For example, it could be
that the United States experienced broadbased managerial innovations
that raised TFP growth throughout the economy. Nevertheless, the previ-
ous section suggests that the acceleration—and managerial innovations—
could be associated with the use of ICT.
Several studies explore whether TFP growth across industries is corre-
lated with ICT intensity. In contrast to firm-level studies, these industry
studies rarely find much correlation between ICT capital and TFP growth
(e.g., Stiroh, 2002b; Wolff, 2002). But given the GPT nature of ICT, the con-
temporaneous correlation need not be positive—even if ICT is, in fact, an
important contributor to measured TFP.
Wolff does find that U.S. industries investing heavily in ICT have
greater changes in their occupational mix and the composition of inter-
mediate inputs, consistent with substantial reorganization. Gust and
Marquez (2002) find that, in a sample of industrial countries, those with a
more burdensome regulatory environment—particularly regulations
affecting labor market practices—adopted ICT more slowly and also had
slower TFP growth. Those findings are consistent with the notion that the
uptake of ICT could affect measured TFP in the sectors using the ICT.
3
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37. In a different framework, Krueger and Kumar (2003) ask whether the different educa-
tional systems in the United States and Europe (especially Germany) may be responsible
for their different growth experiences in the 1990s. See also Lynch and Nickell (2002).
38. In terms of standard growth-accounting, van Ark et al. (2002) compare the United States
and the European Union by applying U.S. deflators for ICT and equipment. Earlier com-
parisons by Daveri (2002) and Schreyer (2000), using private sector sources for ICT
investment and stocks, and Colecchia and Schreyer (2002), using national accounts data,
find results broadly consistent with those of van Ark et al. who find that the European
Union and the United States had similar ICT growth rates over 1980-2000. But the
European Union had a lower level of ICT investment. Consequently, the income share of
ICT is much lower in the European Union. As a result, van Ark et al. (2002) find a smaller
direct ICT contribution via capital deepening in the European Union.44 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
As discussed in Section 2, the Gust-Marquez regulatory variables look
similar in the United States and the United Kingdom. But an open ques-
tion is whether, for other reasons, U.S. society was better able to under-
take the disruptions associated with reorganization than was the United
Kingdom (or other countries).
5.2 THE CROSS-INDUSTRY PATTERN OF ICT USE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
A small number of U.S. and U.K. industries account for a large share of
ICT use. For example, the finance/insurance and business services/real
estate sectors have a disproportionate share of computers and software;
communications uses a majority of communications equipment.
Manufacturing, which accounts for about one-fifth of GDP in both coun-
tries, has only 14 to 16% of computers and software in the two countries.
Tables 6 and 7 show one measure of the importance of ICT capital—the
ICT income share, i.e., the ratio of profits attributable to ICT capital to
value added. Between 1990 and 2000, the income share of ICT in the
United Kingdom increased by almost 50%, rising from 4.30% to 6.26%. The
biggest rises occurred in communication (+10.1%), wholesaling (+3.5%),
and nondurables (+2.66%). The overall share is now above the correspon-
ding figure for the United States, 5.50%, which rose by much less in the
1990s. In short, on this measure, the United Kingdom has caught up.
These income shares are central for growth accounting because the con-
tribution of ICT capital to output growth uses these shares as weights on
growth in ICT capital services. These shares are now similar, which means
that we expect a given growth in ICT capital to have the same impact on
output growth. In addition, the GPT model above suggests that unob-
served complementary capital should be closely related to observed
share-weighted ICT capital growth (perhaps with an adjustment for the
relative price of ICT).
5.3 CROSS-INDUSTRY EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF COMPLEMENTARY
INVESTMENT
We now present some preliminary cross-sectional industry evidence for
the United States and the United Kingdom that is, broadly speaking, con-
sistent with the hypothesis that complementary investment associated
with ICT has macroeconomic consequences. In particular, we explore the
correlations between productivity growth (or the productivity accelera-
tion) in the second half of the 1990s and various measures of ICT growth.
Such regressions are, of course, fraught with the potential for misspec-
ification, given the uncertainty about how long it takes to build comple-
mentary capital and how long it takes for any spillovers to occur. In
addition, given the difficulty of identifying valid instruments, all of ourThe Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 45
regression results are ordinary least squares (OLS); they capture any cor-
relation between true non-ICT-related industry productivity growth and
the accumulation of ICT capital, regardless of the direction of causation (if
there is any causation at all). It follows that all our regressions need to be
interpreted with a high degree of caution, and they should be interpreted
in the spirit of data exploration. Nevertheless, the results suggest that the
GPT model does help illuminate the effects of ICT on productivity.
We begin by estimating equation (10). One important difficulty in
implementing this equation is that we don't know the length of time over
which it should operate. The time lags depend on factors such as the time
it takes to learn, innovate, and reorganize, which depends in large part on
the adjustment costs associated with that complementary capital invest-
ment. Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) find evidence of long lags in firm-level
data; Howitt (1998) calibrates a model to U.S. data and finds that the ben-
eficial effects of a new GPT will not be detected in conventional national
accounts data for more than 20 years.
To capture these notions in a loose way, we consider the following:
Ap1995-2000= c. + ^1995-2000 + ^1990-1995 + ^1980-1990 + £.
In this regression, &
1995-
2000, for example, represents the average value of k for
computers and software over the period 1995 to 2000.
3
9 Thus, we regress
average industry TFP growth over the 1995-2000 period on average share-
weighted computer and software capital growth in the 1980s, early 1990s,
and late 1990s. (We ignore the relative price terms in these regressions.)
We take this equation for each industry as a cross-sectional observation.
This approach imposes an identical constant term on each industry, so
that any industry-specific fixed effects show up in the error term.
4
0 Thus,
this regression will tell us, simply as a matter of data description, whether
we can relate productivity growth to relatively current as well as lagged
ICT investment in the cross section. Because we are running an OLS
regression, we cannot, of course, infer causation from the results. But this
regression tells us whether productivity growth from 1995-2000 was
larger in industries that had rapid share-weighted ICT growth in the late
or early 1990s, the 1980s, or none of the above. (With minimal restrictions
on the timing and stability; these are likely to differ across industries.) In
the results that follow, we omit ICT-producing industries to focus on links
between ICT use and TFP. (Including ICT producers generally has little
39. The regressions including communications equipment as part of ICT gave results that
were less significant—arguably because of lack of sufficient adjustment for quality
change in communications equipment.
40. We find similar results for a specification that removes these fixed effects by making the
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Figure 1 CAPITAL SHARE x CAPITAL GROWTH
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1. Using k = SK A In k as right-hand regressor, with computers and software as measure of capital. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. We omit ICT-producing industries (this omission has relatively little
effect on coefficients).
effect on coefficients.) We report results for only the measures of k described
above—i.e., for share weighted computer-and-software capital growth.
Figure 1 plots the individual components (computers and software
capital) of this measure in the United Kingdom and the United States. The
figure shows substantial fluctuations over time for k in the United Kingdom
and a more stable pattern for the United States, especially since 1990. This
measure of k drops the relative price terms from the alternatives discussed;
regression results below appeared more stable with this measure than with
the alternatives, although qualitative results were generally similar.
The first column of Table 8 shows that, for the United States, the data
are reasonably consistent with the predictions of the theory section that,
with long lags, ICT capital growth should be positively associated with
TFP growth and that, controlling for past investments, contemporaneous
ICT capital growth should be negatively associated with TFP growth. The
data definitely want different coefficients across the well-measured and
poorly measured groups, which we have addressed by interacting
a poorly measured dummy with all right-hand-side variables.
4
1
41. The point estimates give a reasonable summary of what happens when we estimate
regressions for the two groups separately.52 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
We find that, for both groups, ICT capital investments in the 1980s are
positively correlated with the TFP acceleration in the late 1990s. For the
poorly measured industries, ICT capital investments from the early 1990s
were also positively associated with the TFP acceleration. In the late
1990s, by contrast, share-weighted capital growth is negatively correlated
with the TFP acceleration, statistically significantly so for the poorly
measured industries. The results for the poorly measured industries are
consistent with the firm-level evidence in Bryjolfsson and Hitt (2002) and
also suggest a lag length of about five years for U.S. firms.
These results are not driven by outliers. For example, two influential
observations (based on the Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch hat matrix test)
4
2 are
wholesale and retail trade. Because of the importance of those two indus-
tries in accounting for TFP growth, we experimented with omitting them.
Doing so makes 1980s growth less important but 1990s growth more
important—1990-1995 is more positive and 1995-2000 is more negative.
These results could reflect that wholesale and retail trade have particu-
larly long lags because of the importance of complementary capital. They
may also be industries where endogeneity is particularly important. (For
reasons unrelated to GPT arguments, ICT grew a lot in the late 1990s, just
when the scale of complementary investment was waning.
43)
For the United Kingdom the same regression shows little.
4
4 Almost
nothing is statistically significant, and the signs are reversed from what
theory suggested. The lack of significance could reflect mismeasurement—
the industry ICT capital stock data for the 1980s are not that reliable. But
taken at face value, these results suggest that either the slowdown in U.K.
TFP growth was not driven by complementary capital investment or that
our ICT-based proxy for such investment works particularly poorly in the
United Kingdom (perhaps because our specification is too simple).
Another possibility is that the timing assumptions embedded in the esti-
mating equation (on lags between observed ICT investment and unob-
served complementary investments) do not match the U.K. experience.
42. One standard statistical test is to look at the diagonal of the hat matrix, X'(X'X)"
1 X'. For
a regression with k coefficients and n observations, Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) iden-
tify influential observations as those where the diagonal element of the hat matrix
exceeds 2k/n.
43. Using the Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch hat matrix test, influential observations include tele-
phone and telegraph, wholesale and retail trade, depository and nondepository institu-
tions, securities brokers, real estate, and business services. When those observations
(which account for about one-third of GDP) are omitted, there is no evidence that poorly
measured and well-measured industries look different—including the dummy variables
would have only minor effects on coefficients or even standard errors. When these out-
liers are omitted, the data suggest that lagged growth of share-weighted computers and
software are positively correlated with late 1990s TFP growth, whereas contemporane-
ous growth is negatively correlated with TFP.
44. Due to concerns about the data, we drop rail transport, leaving 29 industries.The Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 53
Table 9 shows results from our second specification, equation (11), which
we term the investment accelerator specification. As noted in the theory dis-
cussion, this equation may perform better if the complementary investment
were closely correlated in time with the ICT investment. We can estimate
this equation as a cross section for different time periods. When we do so,
we find the right-hand side variables are insignificant. This finding is not
surprising because the constant term in the specification differs across
industries and may well be correlated with the explanatory variables. But a
cross-section regression imposes a common constant. Hence we prefer to
take first differences of both sides, thus eliminating the fixed effects. Our
dependent variable is now the acceleration of TFP growth; i.e., average TFP
growth in 1995-2000 minus average TFP growth in 1990-1995. The ICT and
investment-deepening terms are defined analogously as changes in
weighted growth rates. The estimating equation thus becomes:
( A I tl ;; 1995-2OOO ~ ^ i rl ,- 1990_1995 j
 = Cj + a (^i, 1995-2000 ~ ^i, 1990 -1995 j
~ b{ U, 1995-2000 — U, 1990-1995 ) + £,
Table 9 shows these results. For the United States, this equation shows little,
basically reflecting the point made above, that the U.S. data want long lags.
By contrast, in the United Kingdom, the coefficients have the expected
signs and are statistically significant. As expected, ICT capital deepening
enters with a positive sign and is significant. Also as expected, investment
deepening has a negative sign; we find that it too is significant. Three
industries are influential according to the hat matrix, but dropping them
has little effect on the results.
This result is highly suggestive, but there is an important qualification.
Multiplying these means by their respective coefficients, we find that cap-
ital deepening would have raised TFP growth by 0.93% per annum on
average, while investment deepening would have lowered it by 0.47% per
Table 9 INVESTMENT-ACCELERATION FORM OF ICT REGRESSION
1
United States United Kingdom
VM,1995-2000 ~ ^,1990-1995/ 0.21 4.41
(2.27) (1.02)





1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constant term not shown. We omit ICT-producing industries
(this omission has relatively little effect on coefficients).54 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
annum, for a net positive effect of 0.46% per annum. So although investment
deepening did serve to retard measured TFP growth, it cannot be said to
account for the absolute fall in TFP growth.
On the other hand, one would expect endogeneity considerations to be
particularly important in this equation, in a way that works against finding
results consistent with the GPT hypothesis, even if true. In this specification,
we regress the TFP acceleration on the contemporaneous investment accel-
eration. Because investment is endogenous, a positive industry-specific tech-
nology shock could lead to higher investment as well as higher TFP, thereby
biasing the coefficient on investment upward. Hence, the true investment
coefficient may be more negative than we find in our OLS regression.
In sum, the U.S. evidence is consistent with the notion that ICT invest-
ments affect measured productivity growth with a long (but variable) lag.
Contemporaneously, they are correlated with a lot of diverted resources
toward unmeasured complementary investment, and hence they are neg-
atively correlated with output—once one controls for lagged growth
rates. It appears that, in the United Kingdom, the rapid growth of ICT
investment after 1995—which was higher than the growth of the ICT cap-
ital stock—appreciably retarded the measured growth of productivity.
Comparing the second half with the first half of the 1990s, the change in
TFP growth is positively and significantly related to the change in ICT
capital deepening. But it appears significantly and negatively associated
with ICT investment growth. In the long run, of course, ICT capital and
investment must grow at the same rate. This finding suggests one reason
that TFP growth in the United Kingdom will eventually recover, at least
somewhat. The U.K. data suggest that the lags are much shorter—and
that complementary investment was going on in the late 1990s. Although
this effect is present, it is not large enough to explain the TFP slowdown
in the United Kingdom in the late 1990s.
5.4 EXPLAINING THE U.K. EXPERIENCE
The basic story that we wish to tell based on our simple model of com-
plementary capital investment is one where measured output growth is
contemporaneously low when complementary investment is high, and it
is high in periods after such investment has taken place and the stock of
complementary capital is high. The theory also suggests that complemen-
tary capital investment will generally be high when observed investment
in ICT capital times the share of such capital is high.
Apart from the evidence presented in Table 9, another reason we took
this approach is that the aggregate data appear consistent with this story.
Look at Figure 1 and the summary statistics by subsample for the United
States and the United Kingdom given in Table 1. The regressions used theThe Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 55
industry-level versions of the variable plotted in the top panel of Figure 1,
the computer share times the growth rate of the computer stock, but we
also plot the analogous series for software in the lower panel. We conclude
that the United Kingdom had far larger swings in this key variable than
did the United States, especially in the period before 1995. As we discussed
before, the regressions with U.S. data support the hypothesis that the pos-
itive effects of IT investment and—we assume—complementary capital
investment show up in measured output with a lag of about five years.
(Two important industries in the United States, wholesale and retail trade,
prefer longer lags, but these industries are not as important for explaining
the U.K. experience as they are for explaining the U.S. experience.)
If investments become productive with roughly a five-year lag, Figure
1 shows that the broad outlines of the macro experience in the United
Kingdom are consistent with the story that we are telling. Note that the
United Kingdom had extremely high levels of k for both computers and
software in the 1985-1990 period, and both dropped sharply in the
1990-1995 period as the United Kingdom fell into a deep recession. Our
story suggests that measured TFP growth in 1985-1990 should have been
low, and measured growth in 1990-1995 should have been high. This is
the pattern one finds in Table 1, where TFP growth in 1985-1990 was 1.2%,
and growth in 1990-1995 was 1.6%. Note that this difference is almost cer-
tainly understated because the TFP numbers have not been corrected for
cyclical mismeasurement coming from changes in utilization. The period
of the late 1980s was a time of strong output and fixed investment growth
(3.1 and 7%, respectively), while the corresponding figures for the early
1990s are 1.8 and -0.8%. It is amazing that a period with a deep recession
should show an increase in measured TFP growth at all, and such a devel-
opment indicates to us that the effects of IT and complementary capital
investment may be quantitatively important.
If one accepts this story, then it should be unsurprising that the next five
years were bad for measured TFP growth in the United Kingdom. The
reason is twofold. First, the level of IT investment in the previous five
years was low, so the contribution of complementary capital was pre-
sumably low. Second, the United Kingdom also had a steep increase in
computer and software investment in the second half of the 1990s—in
many ways a stronger surge than the one labeled historic in the United
States. According to our story, this should also have been a time of high
unmeasured investment in complementary capital. Both considerations
have the effect of reducing measured TFP growth.
Some evidence is consistent with the idea that the United Kingdom was
experiencing a surge of supply-driven growth in the period 1995-2000.
Note that during this period the United Kingdom was going from a deep56 • BASU, FERNALD, OULTON, & SRINIVASAN
slump to a boom. The average growth rate of output was 1 percentage
point, and that of investment was 7.2 percentage points, while unem-
ployment fell a full 2.8 percentage points—to 6.7%, a level not seen for
decades. And in the midst of this boom, the inflation rate also fell, by 1.4
percentage points—to 2.5%. Admittedly, it is not clear that embedding our
story in a short-run macro model must lead to this result because we
claim that TFP growth was higher than recorded, in turn because output
growth was also higher than recorded, which should put extra upward
pressure on prices. But it is suggestive in part because it is difficult to see
how else one might reconcile the full set of facts.
Having said all this, it remains true that, although regression results
for U.K. industries are somewhat consistent with this GPT story, the
point estimates do not allow us to explain the recent growth and TFP
experience based on investment in unmeasured complementary capi-
tal. That is, the regression suggests that the net effect of ICT is to raise,
not lower, TFP growth when comparing the first and second halves of
the 1990s.
But as we have already discussed, the form of the equation that appears
to work better for the United Kingdom is also subject to larger endogene-
ity concerns, with a bias against finding support for the GPT view; this
provides a potential, but so far only speculative, reconciliation. A second
possibility is that the accumulation of complementary capital requires
large inputs of skilled labor. This possibility suggests that our proxy for
complementary investment may be too simple; we may also need to allow
for cross-industry variations in skill intensity. Indeed, it could be that,
even if complementary investment explains the divergent TFP perfor-
mance, it is not, in fact, as closely linked to ICT capital accumulation in
the United Kingdom as it is in the United States.
6. Conclusion
The "crime" or puzzle we investigated in this paper was the slowdown in
U.K. productivity growth, both TFP and labor, in the second half of the
1990s, which coincided with rising U.S. productivity growth. We found
that for the private nonfarm economy, the slowdown was nearly one per-
centage point. The slowdown was particularly marked in industries like
wholesale and retail trade, that were among the major contributors to the
U.S. improvement.
Many proposed explanations for the weak U.K. productivity perfor-
mance seem insufficient. For example, the differences do not reflect dif-
ferences in the importance of ICT production or a failure to account for
falling labor quality. Nor do the genuine differences in national accountsThe Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 57
methodology explain the differences: the U.K. slowdown persists even
when the same methodology is applied to both countries.
Earlier work for the United States suggested that the disruption cost
associated with investment might play a role because, in periods when
investment is rising, such costs may reduce measured productivity
growth. Investment accelerated even more sharply in the United
Kingdom than in the United States in the second half of the 1990s, so this
suspect has some explaining to do. We found that disruption costs could
account for at most about one-third of the measured slowdown.
The most obvious suspects for the U.K. performance seem to have ali-
bis, so we take an alternative path.
4
5 In particular, we believe that under-
standing why the United Kingdom has not yet seen a TFP acceleration
requires that we understand why, in fact, the United States did. Our
answer emphasizes ICT and the role of complementary investments and
innovations induced by it. To many observers, ICT seems to be the major
locus of innovation in recent decades, but at the same time, we find that
most of the measured TFP acceleration took place outside the production
of ICT goods. These two observations are consistent with the predictions
of models of ICT as a general-purpose technology.
In particular, a pervasive theme of the microeconomic literature on
ICT is the need for organizational change if full advantage is to be taken
of the new technology. We modeled organizational change as the accu-
mulation of intangible complementary capital, which means that the
typical firm is also producing a stream of intangible output that consti-
tutes gross investment in complementary capital. Some of this output,
such as the production of own-account software, is now explicitly
measured in the national accounts, but arguably much is not. To the
extent that there is unmeasured output and unmeasured capital, con-
ventional TFP growth will be a biased measure of true technical change.
Growth in the complementary capital stock tends to raise measured
TFP growth, but growth of complementary investment tends to reduce
it by diverting resources from normal production. During the transition
to a new steady state, the net bias can go either way, but the more that
the growth rate of complementary investment (unmeasured output)
exceeds that of complementary capital (unmeasured input), the more
likely it is that measured TFP will be below the true rate of technical
change. This GPT view also suggests that current productivity growth
45. In keeping with the mystery theme of this paper, now seems an appropriate time to quote
Sherlock Holmes: "[W]hen you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, how-
ever improbable, must be the truth." We are dumbfounded anew by Holmes's genius
because we have never managed to exclude enough impossibles to reduce the improba-
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may be influenced by the accumulation of complementary capital in
earlier periods.
A fundamental difficulty, of course, is that complementary investment
and capital are unmeasured. Theory suggests, however, that observed
ICT capital and investment should serve as reasonable proxies. In line
with this GPT view, the U.S. industry data suggest that ICT capital growth
is associated with industry TFP growth with long (and perhaps variable)
lags of five to 15 years. Indeed, if we control for past growth in ICT capi-
tal, contemporaneous growth in ICT capital is negatively associated with
TFP growth in the late 1990s. We find this result encouraging because, to
our knowledge, no other empirical exercise has connected aggregate and
industry-level U.S. TFP performance in the late 1990s either to the per-
suasive macro models of general-purpose technologies or to the stimulat-
ing micro empirical work that supports the GPT hypothesis.
The results for the United Kingdom are weaker. But we do find that, in the
United Kingdom, the rapid growth of ICT investment after 1995, which was
higher than the growth of ICT capital, appreciably retarded the measured
growth of productivity. Comparing the second with the first half of the 1990s,
the change in TFP growth is positively and significantly related to the change
in ICT capital deepening. But it is significantly and negatively associated with
ICT investment growth (the latter weighted by the investment-output ratio).
These results are consistent with the notion that U.K. firms were accumulat-
ing complementary capital intensively in the late 1990s, in contrast with the
U.S. accumulation much earlier. Hence, in this view, the U.K. economy most
likely experienced strong underlying TFP growth despite the poor measured
figures. But the point estimates suggest that, as a whole, ICT investment
raised, not lowered, overall TFP growth in the United Kingdom in the late
1990s—i.e., they do not explain the pervasive TFP slowdown.
The results in this paper are suggestive, but it is too early to indict com-
plementary capital as the sole perpetrator of the crime. Of course, it is
always a challenge to provide incontrovertible proof of a hypothesis that
implies that both inputs and output are unobserved! Nevertheless, sev-
eral puzzles remain. In particular, if our hypothesis is correct, why did the
United Kingdom invest later in complementary capital than did
the United States? Even if they did invest later, why are the coefficients on
contemporaneous ICT investment so low?
One hypothesis that we are considering in current research is that
there may have been a shortage of skilled, college-educated managers
to implement the necessary reorganizations earlier. This hypothesis
would suggest that our model (and our empirical specification) is too
simple: we need a third factor, skilled labor, to make complementary
capital productive or else its accumulation cheaper. Certainly, theThe Case of the Missing Productivity Growth • 59
evidence that the skills premium has widened in the United Kingdom
(as it did earlier in the United States) is potentially consistent with this
view. This hypothesis also suggests that, on its own, ICT might be an
inadequate proxy to capture fully the complementary investments we
think are happening.
In addition, although labor and product market regulation generally
appear similar, differences in competitive intensity could still play a role.
A major contrast between the United States and the United Kingdom is in
wholesale and retail trade. As we have seen, productivity rose sharply in
these industries in the United States after 1995, but it fell in the United
Kingdom. Some (e.g., Lovegrove et al., 1998) have blamed restrictive
planning laws in the United Kingdom, which may have hampered the
growth of so called big box retailing.
4
6 But it is not immediately clear why
the major U.K. retailers (who also perform the wholesale function) should
invest less in ICT for this reason alone: why would a comparatively low
store size in a chain of supermarkets inhibit the retail firm from investing
in computerized inventory control systems? However, if planning laws
reduce competitive intensity by blocking entry, then they may inhibit
investment too. In any event, the role of competitive intensity also seems
a fruitful topic for future research.
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This is a very ambitious, very careful, very honest paper. Unfortunately,
ambition, care, and honesty are only necessary conditions for success. A
bit of luck is also needed and, in this case, luck was not there. The case of
U.K. missing productivity growth is not solved. But much is learned, and,
building on the paper, more will be learned in the future. Let me first
briefly summarize the three major points of the paper.
1. The Divergent Paths ofTFP Growth in the United States
and the United Kingdom
The basic facts laid out in Tables 4 and 5 of the paper, and reduced to their
essence in Table 1 here, are striking. TFP growth in the IT-using sector
increased substantially in the second half of the 1990s in the United States
but decreased substantially in the United Kingdom. Given that the cycli-
cal behavior of the two economies was largely similar over the decade,
this suggests the need to look for structural rather than cyclical factors
behind this divergence.
2. IT and Organization Capital
A preeminent role is given to IT for the performance of the U.S. economy
in the second half of the 1990s, so this is a logical place to start looking.
The authors point out the complex dynamic relation between IT invest-
ment, organization investment, and measured TFP.
Table 1 TFP GROWTH IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED



































Here again, it may be worth giving a bare-bones version of the more
elaborate model in the paper. Suppose output depends only on organiza-
tional capital, C, and labor, N, and is used either for final goods, Y, or for
investment in organizational capital, A. Organizational capital depreci-
ates at rate 8:
Y = F(C,N)- A
C = A + (1
True TFP growth is zero by construction. Measured TFP growth is given
by:
/M AC (A\AA
Y ) C \Yj A
Growth of unmeasured organization capital leads to an upward bias in
measured TFP growth, and growth of unmeasured organization invest-
ment leads to a downward bias.
What is therefore the net effect of organization capital accumulation?
Around the steady state, g can be rewritten as:
„= (r_C\AC_UC\(AC_AA\
In steady state AC/C = AA/A, so only the first term remains: measured
TFP growth exceeds true TFP growth. Out of steady state, the net effect
depends on the relation of the growth of capital to the growth of in-
vestment. A period of increasing investment is likely to lead to under-
measurement of true TFP growth. This can be seen more clearly by
manipulating the previous equation to get:
C\ AC _ C (1_g
Measured TFP growth depends positively on the growth rate of organi-
zation capital, negatively on the change in the growth rate of organization
investment. I would have liked the authors to try a specification closer to
the spirit of this specification, allowing for the rate of change of organiza-
tion capital (or the proxy used for it), and a distributed lag in the rate of
change of organization investment, constrained to have a sum of coeffi-
cients equal to zero. It would have made the results and the estimated
dynamic structure perhaps easier to interpret.66 • BLANCHARD
3. Different IT Accumulation Paths in the United States
and the United Kingdom?
The basic implication of the model is that a boom in organization invest-
ment leads initially to a decrease in measured TFP, and only later to the
promised increase. This suggests a potential explanation for the United
Kingdom/United States difference: the boom in IT investment, and thus
the boom in induced organization investment, happened earlier in the
United States than in the United Kingdom. In the second half of the 1990s,
the United States was already reaping the positive effects of high organi-
zation capital, and so measured TFP growth was high. The United
Kingdom, on the other hand, was still paying the cost of high organiza-
tion investment, and measured TFP growth was accordingly low. Under
this interpretation, the effects will turn positive, and the future may be
brighter.
The authors take this hypothesis to the sectoral data, looking at the
dynamic relation between TFP growth and proxies for organization capi-
tal. This is where the data do not cooperate. The dynamic story appears to
work decently for the United States. But it works extremely poorly for the
United Kingdom. There is no evidence for a lag structure from IT to pro-
ductivity growth along the lines suggested by the theory. The authors put
a good face on the results, but one cannot conclude that the case has been
solved. Let me take each of these points in turn, first focusing on the gen-
eral line of arguments, then returning to the United States/United
Kingdom comparison.
4. On the General Story
4.1 HOW WELL ESTABLISHED ARE THE BASIC TFP FACTS?
The first issue is a standard one. Even if one takes TFP growth numbers at
face value, the question is, How much can be read in differences in sam-
ple means over periods as short as five years? TFP growth varies a lot
from year to year. Using the series constructed in the paper, the sample
standard deviation of TFP growth over the last 20 years in the United
Kingdom is 1.8%, implying a standard deviation for a five-year mean of
about 0.8%. A difference of 1.4%, the number in the table for the difference
between U.S. and U.K. productivity growth in the IT-using sector for 1995
to 2000, is not that significant. One could probably ask for more time to
pass before feeling that there was a puzzle to be explained.
The second issue is that there are many decisions to be made in con-
structing TFP growth (income or expenditure side, quality weighting of
labor, and so on), and so different studies give different results. TheComment • 67
authors of this paper conclude that TFP growth in the IT-using sector
increased by 0.9% in the United States from 1990-1995 to 1995-2000 (and
overall TFP growth, that is, TFP growth for the whole private nonfarm
economy, increased over the same period by 1.2%). This appears to be at
the high end of the range of available estimates.
At the low end is Robert Gordon (2000, Table 2), who concludes that
there was roughly no increase in underlying TFP growth in the IT-using
sector from 1992-1995 to 1995-1999, and a small (0.3%) increase for the
whole private nonfarm economy. Next are Oliner and Sichel (2002, Table
4), with an increase of 0.3% in the IT-using sector, and an overall increase
of 0.7%. Slightly higher is Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), with an increase of
0.4% for the IT-using sector (1991-1995 to 1995-1998), and an overall
increase of 0.6%. At the high end is the work reported in the Economic
Report of the President (Council of Economic Advisers, 2001), with an
increase of 1% for the IT-using sector, and an increase of 1.2% overall.
All the estimates are (weakly) positive; this is good news. But the mag-
nitudes vary, and one wonders whether plausible variations on hedonic
pricing of the IT-producing sector, and thus in the price of IT goods, could
not change the allocation of TFP growth between IT-producing and
IT-using sectors by a magnitude that would dominate the numbers
reported in the previous paragraph and substantially affect the conclu-
sions. This may not affect much the comparison of the United States and
the United Kingdom. But it would affect the interpretation of the results:
if there was no strong evidence of an increase in TFP growth in the IT-
using sector, explanations based on unmeasured organization investment
and capital lose a lot of their appeal.
4.2 WHAT ARE THE OUTPUT COSTS OF REORGANIZATION?
It is essential for the authors' thesis that high investment in organizational
capital have substantial adverse effects on measured output, and there-
fore on measured TFP. A study by Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) on the
effects of mergers on TFP is relevant here. Not very surprisingly, they find
that TFP in the merged firms goes from 3.9% below the conditional sec-
toral mean to 1.2% below after seven years. More relevant to the issue at
hand, however, is their finding that the improvement is a steady one:
there is no evidence of a temporary decrease in measured TFP before reor-
ganization starts paying off.
This evidence is not totally conclusive. Reorganization after mergers
may be very different from the types of changes triggered by new IT pos-
sibilities. But it makes one want to see more micro evidence that the accu-
mulation of organization capital can have major adverse effects on
measured output. This takes me to the next point.68 • BLANCHARD
4.3 RETAIL TRADE, THE McKINSEY STUDY, AND WAL-MART
As the authors point out, fully one-third of the increase in TFP growth
from the first to the second half of the 1990s in the United States came from
the retail trade sector. For this reason, the general merchandising segment,
which represents 20% of sales in the sector, was one of the sectors exam-
ined in a McKinsey study (McKinsey Global Institute, 2001) aimed at
understanding the factors behind U.S. TFP growth in the 1990s.
The study confirmed that there was indeed a large increase in productiv-
ity growth, with the growth rate of sales per hour increasing from 3.4% dur-
ing 1987-1995 to 6.7% from 1995-1999, and it reached two main conclusions:
first that more than two-thirds of the increase could indeed be traced to reor-
ganization; second, that much of this reorganization came from the use of IT.
The study also provided a sense of what reorganization means in prac-
tice. Improvements in productivity were the result of "more extensive use
of cross docking and better flows of goods/palleting; the use of better
forecasting tools to better align staffing levels with demand; redefining
store responsibilities and cross training of employees; improvements in
productivity measurements and utilization rates at check-out." It also
showed that, while innovations were first implemented by Wal-Mart,
competitors were forced to follow suit, leading to a steady diffusion of
these innovations across firms in the second half of the 1990s.
How does the story fit the authors' thesis? In some ways, very well:
reorganization, linked with IT investment, clearly played a central role in
the increase in TFP growth in the retail sector in the 1990s. But in other
and more important ways, the evidence goes against the basic thesis of
the paper: the major increase in IT capital took place in the second half of
the 1990s. During that period, productivity growth and profits steadily
increased. There is no discernible evidence of the adverse effects of orga-
nization investment on output, productivity, or profits.
5. Back to the United States and the United Kingdom
5.1 THE RELATIVE EVOLUTION OF IT SPENDING
Having stated their hypothesis, the authors proceed to test it using sec-
toral data. But a natural first step is just to look at the timing of IT invest-
ment in both the United States and the United Kingdom and see whether
it fits the basic hypothesis.
The authors actually do it, but only in passing, in Figure 1. And what
they show does not give strong support to the hypothesis. The figure plots
the growth contribution of IT capital in the IT-using sector—constructed
as the product of the share times the rate of growth of IT capital. If theirComment • 69
hypothesis were right, one would expect to see high IT investment in the
United States early on, and high IT investment in the United Kingdom
only at the end of the sample. Actual evolutions are quite different. The
United Kingdom appears to have two periods of high IT capital contribu-
tions: one in the late 1980s, the other in the late 1990s. It does not seem to
be lagging the United States in any obvious way.
This impression is largely confirmed in work by others. Table 2 below
is constructed from data in Colecchia and Schreyer (2002, Table 1). It also
gives the contribution of IT spending to growth, measured as the product
of the share times the rate of growth of IT capital for four subperiods,
from 1980 to 2000. The numbers yield two conclusions.
First, the growth contribution of IT appears substantially lower in
Europe than in the United States, a conclusion at odds with Figure 1 in the
paper, which puts the IT contribution to growth in the United Kingdom,
both in computers and software, above that in the United States. Much of
the difference appears attributable to the multiplication by 3 by the
authors of investment in software, and so the larger share of software in
their data, relative to Colecchia and Schreyer. The adjustment may well be
justified, but it is obviously rough and is a reminder of the many assump-
tions behind the data we are looking at.
Second, and more directly relevant here, the acceleration in IT appears to
have been stronger at the end of the 1990s in the United States than in the
three European countries. The contribution to growth roughly doubled in
the last five years from an already high level. It also roughly doubled in the
United Kingdom and France, but from a lower level. It increased, but far
from doubled, in Germany. If these numbers are correct, and if investment in
organization is indeed closely related to investment in IT, it is measured TFP
growth in the United States that should have suffered the most from unmea-
sured investment in the late 1990s, not TFP growth in the United Kingdom.
5.2 WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE AGAIN
The sectoral data in the paper give what looks like a promising lead for
solving the case of missing productivity. Table 3, constructed from
Table 2 CONTRIBUTION OF IT TO GROWTH FOR FOUR COUNTRIES,
1980 TO 2000
1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000
United States 0.44 0.43 0.43 0.87
United Kingdom 0.18 0.29 0.27 0.48
France 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.33
Germany 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.3870 • BLANCHARD
Tables 4 and 5 in the paper, summarizes the relevant information. The first
and second columns report TFP growth in 1990-1995 and 1995-2000. The
third shows the change in TFP growth. The fourth shows the share of the
two sectors in value added. The last column shows the product of change
and share, and shows therefore the contribution of the two trade sectors to
the change in TFP growth in the two countries. In the United States, the con-
tribution is 0.8%; in the United Kingdom, the contribution is -1.0%. From an
accounting point of view, the evolution of TFP growth in just the trade sec-
tor accounts for close to half of the difference between the overall evolution
of U.S. and U.K. TFP growth from the first to the second half of the 1990s.
This suggests looking at trade more closely. Indeed, the absolute num-
bers for U.K. TFP growth in both wholesale and retail for the second half
of the 1990s are puzzling. Can it be that TFP growth was actually negative
in the United Kingdom during that period? I checked the evolution of
labor productivity, using OECD data from the STAN project. For whole-
sale and retail trade together, that source gives a growth rate of real value
added of 3.2% a year, a growth rate for employment of 1.0%, so a rate of
labor productivity growth of 2.2%. If the numbers are consistent with
those used by the authors, this suggests an unusually high rate of capital
accumulation during the period, capital that was not used very produc-
tively. This raises the question, Why was it used more productively in the
United States?
Unfortunately, I do not know enough about the retail sector in the
United Kingdom to give the answer or even help direct the search. In a
related McKinsey project (McKinsey Global Institute, 2002) in which
I participated, we looked at the evolution of labor productivity in the
retail sector in the 1990s in Germany and France. Labor productivity was
1.1% for Germany, 1.5% for France, and 2% for the United States. For the
first two countries, regulations affecting the rate at which various retail
formats could grow seemed relevant. Such regulations appear much less
relevant, however, for the United Kingdom in the 1990s.
Table 3 GROWTH CONTRIBUTIONS OF WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE































An alternative way of looking at the United Kingdom/United States evo-
lutions in the aggregate is that, for most of the postwar period, European
TFP growth was high due to convergence. All Europe had to do was copy,
not innovate. And this has largely come to an end.
The problem, as the authors mention, is that, in many countries, conver-
gence has not been fully achieved. While several countries indeed have a
level of output per worker close or even higher than the United States, this
is not the case for the United Kingdom. According to Table 2 in the paper,
U.K. output per worker stands at roughly 70% of the U.S. level.
Theory, however, predicts conditional convergence, not absolute con-
vergence. A country with bad institutions (whatever this exactly means)
will not achieve the same level of productivity as one with better institu-
tions. I mention this not because it is a new insight, but because this seems
to be happening in Europe. Several countries that were much poorer and
had been converging for the past few decades seem now to be growing
only at the European average, no longer catching up. Portugal and Greece
come to mind, but the United Kingdom, in a less obvious way because the
gap is much smaller and thus less visible, may be in the same predicament.
So, was it problems in the use of capital in the trade sector, or was it sim-
ply the end of convergence? We still do not know. But, thanks to the paper,
we have a better sense of what to look for, and we have a number of lids
to open. I wish the authors good luck in solving the case in the future.
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1. Introduction
The exceptional productivity performance of the U.S. economy in the
period 1995-2000 is well documented (see, for example, Jorgenson 2001):
relative to the previous five years, total factor productivity (TFP) growth
accelerated by 0.7% (and labor productivity growth by 1%) per year in
1995-2000. What are the sources of this sharp acceleration? Should we
expect this higher TFP growth to be a long-term trend for the future, as
some argue, or is it just a transitory phenomenon? Basu, Fernald, Oulton,
and Srinivasan offer a comparative macroeconomics perspective to these
important questions. They bring into the picture the experience of another
country, the United Kingdom, which in many dimensions is similar to the
United States.
From a long-run perspective, the U.S. and the U.K. economies stand at
the same stage of development and share—unlike many other European
countries—a similar institutional framework of labor and product mar-
kets. From a short-run perspective, the business cycle in the two
economies in the 1990s was remarkably akin. I'd like to add that the
United States and the United Kingdom were the only two among the
developed economies that experienced a substantial rise in earnings
inequality in the past 30 years, with analogous characteristics (e.g., both
within and between skill groups).
Given these short-run and more structural affinities, one would expect
a similar evolution of TFP growth in the 1990s for the U.K. economy.
Instead, U.K. TFP growth decelerated by 0.5% (and labor productivity
growth by 1%) per year from 1990-1995 to 1995-2000.
How do we explain the missing productivity growth in the United
Kingdom (or the exceedingly high productivity growth in the United States)?
Basu et al. build a convincing argument on two assumptions. First,
because of unmeasured organizational capital that is complementary with
information technology (IT) capital in production, TFP growth is
mismeasured. Periods of strong investment in IT (and in the complemen-
tary organizational capital) are times where mostly output is unmea-
sured, so true TFP growth is underestimated, whereas periods where the
economy has large stocks of IT and complementary capital are times
where inputs are grossly undermeasured, and true TFP growth is overes-
timated. Second, IT investment boomed with a lag of 5 to 10 years in theComment • 73
U.K. economy, relative to the U.S. economy. Thus, in 1995-2000, TFP
growth was underestimated in the United Kingdom and overestimated in
the United States, which explains, at least qualitatively, the gap.
This comment is organized into three parts: (1) an exploration of the
role of convergence between the United Kingdom and the United States
within a Solow-growth model; (2) a deeper look into the retail sector,
where the TFP acceleration gap between the two countries is particularly
striking; and (3) a quantitative exercise based on the model developed by
Basu et al. in Section 4 of their paper.
2. Convergence
If one extends the comparison for the two countries back to the early
1980s (see Basu et al., Table 1), it emerges clearly that labor productivity
growth was considerably faster in the United Kingdom until the mid-
1990s. Basu et al. put it in plain words: "[T]he Europeans were catching
up." The authors somewhat downplay the role of transition in their analy-
sis, so here I try to assess if the fact that the United Kingdom was catch-
ing up is relevant in explaining the productivity acceleration gap.
Intuitively, the transitional dynamics of the United Kingdom would nat-
urally lead to a reduction in labor productivity growth as the economy
approaches its steady state.
Think of the two countries (indexed by i) in terms of Solow-model
economies with capital-embodied technical change: at time t the new
investment goods Xi(t) embody a productivity factor A((t) = e
y>.
The model can be summarized as:
x,(t) = syt(t) = sk{(tr
where h{t) is capital per worker, s is the savings rate, a is the income share
of capital, 8 is the depreciation rate, and n is the growth rate of the labor
force. The thought experiment is as follows: start the two economies in
1980 with the same parameter vector (s, a, 8, v, y) but assume that the
United States is already on its balanced-growth path, while the United
Kingdom is endowed with lower capital per worker, so it has a faster
growth rate of labor productivity and slowly converges toward the U.S.
level. In 1990 a technological breakthrough raises permanently capital-
embodied productivity growth to y' in the U.S. economy. From this sim-
ple exercise, one can learn the implied labor productivity growth in the
United Kingdom in the period 1995-2000 under two scenarios: (1) the
acceleration in technological change does not spill over to the United74 • VIOLANTE
Figure 1 CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE
UNITED STATES IN A SOLOW MODEL ECONOMY
.3 3 -
Kingdom and (2) the acceleration occurs with a lag of 5 years in the
United Kingdom.
1
To calibrate the model, I set y = 1.7% and y' = 5.7% to match the data on
average labor productivity in the United States in the period 1980-1995 and
1995-2000, respectively. I chose the initial level of capital in the United
Kingdom so that along the transition in the period 1980-1995, average yearly
productivity growth is 3.4%, as documented in Table 1 by the authors.
2
What can we conclude from this simple exercise on the role of catch-up
and transitional dynamics? Figure 1 shows that, under the first scenario,
the U.K. rate of labor productivity growth implied by the transitional
dynamics in 1995-2000 is 2.4%, which is well below 2.9%, the actual data
from Table 1. In the absence of a rapid technological spillover to the
1. The first scenario corresponds to a lag of 10 years or more, assuming that we are inter-
ested in the period until 2000.
2. The other parameters are set as follows: s = 15%, a = 0.45, 8 = 5%, and n = 1.5%. The some-
what high value of the capital share reflects the presence of human capital.Comment • 75
United Kingdom, pure convergence forces push the implied labor pro-
ductivity too low compared to the data. Under the second scenario, labor
productivity grows at an average yearly rate of 2.8%, thus the combina-
tion of the authors' view that the U.K. "implementation lag" is around
5 years together with catch-up forces explains the deceleration in full (in
fact, it just overexplains it).
3
An obvious question arises: Why did the United Kingdom adopt this
more productive technology later? A satisfactory answer would require a
full investigation. Here, I will limit myself to a brief speculation. In Table 3,
Basu et al. document the educational characteristics of the labor force in
the two countries. The difference with the United Kingdom does not lie so
much in the average numbers of years of schooling, but rather in the fact
that the United Kingdom has a much larger fraction of workers with spe-
cific skills associated with vocational training. At least since Nelson and
Phelps (1966), numerous researchers argued that general education is a
key force in technology adoption. In a recent mimeo, Krueger and Kumar
(2003) embed the Nelson and Phelps mechanism into an equilibrium
model and show that an acceleration in the growth rate of the frontier
technology will increase the TFP growth gap between an economy with
abundant general skills (like the United States) and an economy mostly
endowed with specific skills (like the United Kingdom and most of the
other European countries).
The careful reader will have noticed that the predictions of this exercise
are relevant to explain the labor productivity acceleration gap between the
two countries, but not the TFP growth differential. However, this is true
only if all inputs are correctly measured. Suppose that the productivity
improvements in investment goods captured by the factor A(t) are
completely missed by statisticians. In this case, measured total factor pro-
ductivity z(t) is obtained residually from the production relationship y(t) =
z(t)k(t)
a, with k(t) = x (t) - (8 + n)k(t). In other words, z(t) is an average of all
past values of A(t) weighted by the investment flow in each year.
What are the predictions of our simple calibrated model for TFP?
Simulations under the same exact parametrization show that the model
generates an acceleration in TFP growth for the United States of 1.5% and
an acceleration in TFP growth for the United Kingdom of 0.3% under the
first scenario and of 0.7% under the second scenario. Although the model
produces larger accelerations in absolute value in the two economies (in
particular, it does not generate a TFP deceleration for the United
3. Obviously, if all inputs are correctly measured, the predictions of this exercise are relevant
only to explain the labor productivity acceleration gap between the two countries. TFP is
constant over time.76 • VIOLANTE
Kingdom), it predicts a gap of roughly 1% between the two countries, in
line with the data of Table 1.
3. Institutions in the Retail Sector
A comparison between Table 4 and Table 5 documenting the size of the
TFP acceleration from 1990-1995 to 1995-2000 by industry in the two
countries shows a relatively similar sectoral performance with one impor-
tant exception: in the retail trade sector, TFP growth accelerated by 4.5%
per year in the United States, whereas it decelerated by 1.9% per year in
the United Kingdom. The authors note this puzzling divergence, but they
do not search for its specific causes. It is clear, however, that an argument
based on the dynamics of unmeasurable organizational capital is unlikely
to account for the TFP acceleration gap in the retail industry. Tables 6 and
7 show that the share of IT investments in value added did not change
much between 1990 and 2000 in either country in this sector.
A report of the McKinsey Global Institute (1998) sheds some light on
the puzzle: between 1993 and 1996, fearing a massive "high-street flight"
of retail stores toward the periphery of towns and cities, the U.K. govern-
ment voted a series of planning restrictions establishing that local plan-
ning authorities should promote the development of small retail stores in
town centers and restrict the concession of planning permissions for new
stores or for the extension of existing stores outside town centers. By con-
trast, land regulations in the United States put no significant restrictions
on retailers' location decisions.
As a result of these stringent planning guidelines, a large fraction of retail
stores in the United Kingdom have suboptimal size and are not located opti-
mally on the territory. McKinsey estimates the productivity loss associated
with these strict regulations to be roughly 10% at the sectoral level, so the
entire TFP deceleration in the U.K. retail sector (-1.9% per year compounded
over 5 years) could be explained through this channel. Retail trade is a large
industry, accounting for about 12% of aggregate value added in both
economies, thus these institutional restrictions alone can potentially explain
over 60% of the differential TFP acceleration between the two countries.
4
4. Complementary Capital
The equilibrium model of Section 4 allows Basu et al. to obtain the struc-
tural equation in equation (9) that relates the bias in TFP growth to the
4. Regulatory restrictions that have a significant impact on store size and productivity are
not uncommon in other parts of the world. For example, in Japan, until 2000, the large-
scale retail law limited greatly the entry of stores larger than 1,000 square meters.Comment • 77
change in the stock of complementary capital. Consider a special case of
the model where g = r (the growth rate of the economy equals the interest
rate) and o = 1 (a unitary elasticity between IT capital and the comple-
mentary organizational capital is necessary to have a balanced growth
path in the model), then one can rewrite equation (9) as:
- ATFPt = ^(l-r-§c)[ACr ACM] (1)
where ATFP* is true TFP growth in year t, C/Y
NT is the long-run (or
steady-state) ratio of the stock of complementary capital to output pro-
duced in the non-IT industries, and 8C is the depreciation rate of comple-
mentary capital. Given the assumptions made on the substitutability
between IT capital and C capital in production, the growth rate of com-
plementary capital at time t can be written also as:
AC, = AKl
T + Apt (2)
where AKt
IT is the growth rate of IT capital, and Apt is the change in the
price of new IT investment relative to non-IT output.
The authors use equations (1) and (2) as their statistical model in a
series of cross-sectional regressions where different rates of IT investment
across industries provide a source of variation to estimate the size of the
bias in TFP growth due to the missing C capital. The results are encour-
aging, but not as sharp as one would hope. The main reason of the weak
statistical significance, in my view, lies in the very same point the authors
are trying to prove: if IT is truly a general-purpose technology, then we
should expect similar investment rates across all industries, which makes
the cross-sectional data not very informative. Indeed, Tables 6 and 7 show
that, with the exclusion of a few outliers (like mining, real estate, and
communications), the variability of investment rates in IT among indus-
tries is rather small.
I take a different approach for setting the complementary capital model
in action. The spirit of the exercise will be as follows. From the data on IT
capital and prices and from equation (2), one can construct growth rates
of C capital for the whole decade 1990-2000 for both countries. Together
with a common parametrization for the pair (8C, r), one can then compute
the true TFP growth ATFP* in the two countries for different values of the
complementary capital output ratio, which is unobservable. Finally,
assuming that the United Kingdom and the United States have the same
long-run C/Y
NT ratio along their balanced growth (and this will be the case
if the two economies differ only in the timing of the productivity shock, as
in the convergence exercise), one can ask, What is the specific value of78 • VIOLANTE
Figure 2 GROWTH RATE OF COMPLEMENTARY CAPITAL
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NT that rationalizes the TFP acceleration differential? In other words,
given the scarcity of information contained in the industry-level data, and
the fact that C capital is not directly measurable, the best we can do is
engage in the art of "reverse engineering." I will express later a subjective
judgment on the plausibility of the number obtained.
In the exercise, I will also use another indirect source of measurement
of C capital growth constructed from Hall's (2001): the difference between
the stock-market valuation of firms and the book value of their physical
assets provides an implicit measure of the stock of intangibles in the U.S.
economy.
5
The top panel of Figure 2 plots AQ in the United States measured
through both IT-based and Hall's methods, and AQ in the United
Kingdom measured with the IT-based approach. The U.K. IT-based esti-
mate of C capital growth is higher in the second half of the sample. The
5. Hall's data are available from http://www.stanford.edu/~rehall/. To my knowledge, there
is no similar attempt to obtain an estimate of intangible capital for the U.K. economy.Comment • 79
IT-based measure of C capital growth for the United States is slightly
increasing over time, albeit at a slower pace than the U.K. measure;
instead Hall's U.S. C capital growth is much higher in the first half of the
sample. Taken together, these numbers mean that the correction of the
bias in TFP growth will go in the right direction.
The lower panel of Figure 2 plots—for a range of values of the C/Y
NT
ratio—the true acceleration in TFP between 1990-1995 and 1995-2000 cal-
culated using in equation (1) the three series for AQ just constructed.
6 Note
that when this ratio is zero, we obtain the measured ATFP of Table 1. The
point where the U.S. and the U.K. lines cross corresponds to the value of
the long-run C/Y
NT ratio that reconciles the measured U.S./U.K. differen-
tial in TFP acceleration with equal true TFP growth.
Using Hall's estimates for the growth in the stock of intangible capital
in the United States in the 1990s, this value is 0.26, which corresponds to
a true TFP deceleration of 0.1% per year in both countries. However, if the
U.S. stock market were overvalued in the 1990s, this source of information
on intangibles can be imprecise. The alternative IT-based measure of C
capital for the United States proposed by the authors tells us that the long-
run C/Y
NT ratio that solves the puzzle is around 0.5, which corresponds to
a true acceleration of 0.7% per year in both economies.
How reasonable are these two numbers? I argue that they are quite
plausible. To understand, it is useful to express them in terms of aggregate
output Y (non-IT value-added Y
NT accounts for 95% of total output in the
United States). Take the mean of these two estimates for C/Y, which is
0.35. Given the assumed depreciation rate, this number would imply that
steady-state investment in C capital is less than 6% of output, very close
to the current share of IT investment in U.S. data, which is around 7%.
A C/Y ratio of 0.35 is a conservative estimate in light of the recent work by
McGrattan and Prescott (2002, Table 2), who estimate the stock of intangi-
ble capital in the United States to be around 0.65 of aggregate gross
domestic product (GDP) and, after reviewing the literature, conclude that
a reasonable range for this ratio is between 0.5 and 1.
To conclude, this calculation provides support, from a different angle, to
the authors' main argument: theory is still ahead of measurement. We have
rich models suggesting that organizational capital plays an important role
in macroeconomics, especially in phases of technological transformation,
but we are lacking reliable direct measurements. However, I have also
argued that one should not neglect more traditional explanations of pro-
ductivity differentials, like convergence forces and institutions.
6.1 have assumed that, in both countries, the depreciation rate for C capital 8C is the same as
the depreciation rate for IT used by the authors (16%), and that r = 4%.80 • VIOLANTE
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Discussion
Several participants remarked on the role of the wholesale and retail trade
in the authors' story. Mark Gertler suggested that the TFP slowdown in
the United States appears to be partly associated with a slowdown
in these sectors, which in turn implies that there is something important
about these particular sectors that economists should try to understand.
John Fernald remarked that the wholesale and retail trade contributed to
three-fourths of the difference in TFP growth between the two countries.
He also remarked that net entry alone—the entry of Wal-Mart and the exit
of Kmart—explains the productivity performance of the retail sector.
Robert Shimer counseled caution in the use of Wal-Mart as an example of
the retail trade. He pointed out that by joining together successes such as
Wal-Mart and failures such as Kmart, one would get a more realistic pic-
ture of the U.S. retail trade in the 1990s. In response to Olivier Blanchard's
discussion, Nick Oulton noted that though planning regulations in the
United Kingdom could lower the level of TFP, they should not affect the
growth rate of TFP. He contended that the small size of individual stores
should not affect the incentives for retail chains to invest in IT.
The theme of the choice of sample countries was raised by several par-
ticipants. Mark Gertler questioned the authors' identification assumption
that there are many macroeconomic similarities between the United
Kingdom and the United States. He pointed out that according to the
authors' Table 1, there was moderate growth in output and strong growth
in investment in the United States between 1990 and 1995, but there was
low output growth and no net investment in IT in the United Kingdom.Discussion • 81
Athanasios Orphanides suggested that the authors expand their sample
of two countries to include Australia. It was his view that this approach
would help to deal with the identification issue pointed out by Mark
Gertler because Australia experienced measured productivity growth
even larger than that in the United States but was similar to the United
Kingdom in terms of initial conditions and catching up in the 1990s. Kjetil
Storesletten suggested that Germany and Sweden would be another inter-
esting pair of countries to compare. He observed that there was a rapid
acceleration of TFP growth in the 1990s in Germany, but little growth in
IT investment. In the 1990s, Sweden, like the United States, saw sharply
falling unemployment and an acceleration in TFP, along with widespread
use of IT.
Several participants had concerns about data issues. Robert Shimer con-
tended that the authors were wrong to dismiss the role of declining unem-
ployment in explaining the differential behavior of TFP growth in the
United States and the United Kingdom. He maintained that the bigger
decline in unemployment in the United Kingdom, resulting in the long-
term unemployed being drawn into employment, might contribute more
than the authors estimated to the slow growth of TFP. Nick Oulton
responded that the authors had controlled for the education characteris-
tics as well as the gender and age of the labor force in the United
Kingdom, so composition effects are unlikely to explain the differential
TFP performance between the two countries. In response to Gianluca
Violante's discussion of the aggregation of different qualities of labor,
Susanto Basu agreed that big deviations from Cobb-Douglas do matter.
He contended that the authors' aggregation procedure is not subject to
this problem because they use a Tornqvist average of shares over time,
rather than a pure Cobb-Douglas, to aggregate.
Mark Gertler was curious about whether there are any observable indi-
cators of investment in complementary capital. In response to this ques-
tion, Susanto Basu drew the attention of the audience to several firm-level
studies associated with Brynjolfsson and co-authors from the pre-bubble
period in the United States. These studies document that a $1.00 increase
in IT investment is associated with a $5.00 increase in the stock-market
value of a firm, suggesting the order of magnitude of complementary cap-
ital investments. The studies also indicate that returns to investments in
IT are typically normal or low initially, but large with a five-year lag. He
noted that this finding was consistent with the story of the paper.
Daron Acemoglu pointed out that the authors' lag story has additional
first-order testable implications. He wondered whether investment in IT
would have made sense with lags of the length necessary for the authors'
story given that firms could have invested at the risk-free rate. Second, he82 • DISCUSSION
asked whether a production function with decreasing returns to scale in
factors other than the unobservable complementary capital would fit
other features of the data.
Eva Nagypal commented that the authors do not discuss the distribu-
tion of TFP between newly created and existing firms. She suggested that
differences in the composition of firms between the United States and the
United Kingdom could explain the contrasting behavior of TFP in the two
countries. While creation and destruction of establishments is similar in
the two countries, growth in new establishments is much higher in the
United States, and a large fraction of TFP growth is attributable to them.
Finally, the authors responded to some concerns of the discussants
about data. Nick Oulton noted that differences between national accounts
methodology in the United States and the United Kingdom make cross-
country comparisons difficult. In particular, in the United Kingdom, soft-
ware investment is misclassified as the purchase of an intermediate input,
resulting in a substantial understatement of information and communica-
tions technology (ICT) investment as a whole. With an appropriate adjust-
ment for this misclassification, the growth accounting contribution of ICT
is similar in the United Kingdom and in the United States, even though
stocks are smaller in the United Kingdom. In response to Olivier
Blanchard's discussion, John Fernald pointed out that estimates of the
acceleration in non-ICT production depend on whether the data used is
product data or industry data. He commented that taking account of
investment adjustment costs would strengthen the story that TFP growth
took place mainly in non-ICT-producing sectors because sectors that were
using IT, not producing it, experienced a surge in complementary invest-
ment that diverted resources.